authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

have his wages garnished. Baldwin also stated that he gets anywhere from $2,000 and $3,000 back after taxes through earned income credit and would use that money for restitution.We cannot find that there was any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in determining whether or not Baldwin could make his restitution payments. This issue is without merit." Baldwin v. State, 891 So.2d 274, 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). “[O]ne who is unable to pay will always be in a position of facing a felony conviction and jail time, while those with adequate resources will not. The automatic nature of the fine is what makes it discriminating to the poor, in that only the poor will face jail time. We hold that an indigent's equal protection rights are violated when all potential defendants are offered one way to avoid prosecution and that one way is to pay a fine, and there is no determination as to an individual's ability to pay such a fine. Subjecting one to a jail term merely because he cannot afford to pay a fine, due to no fault of his own, is unconstitutional. Moody v. State, 716 So.2d 562, 565-66 (Miss. 1998) (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983)).

the statutes do not authorize it any more than they authorize a circuit judge to personally receive fine monies in his court, or a chancellor to personally receive public monies in his. There is a clear legislative intent to remove justice court judges from collection of fines. Only the justice court clerk has the statutory authority to collect fines, give receipts for fines, and account for all fine monies paid to the county.” Mississippi Judicial Performance Com'n v. A Justice Court Judge, 580 So.2d at 1262 “This Court therefore makes the following admonition to justice court judges insofar as individually accepting fine monies: Don't.” Id. “Just as with a circuit judge or chancellor, it should only be in some isolated and clearly necessitous circumstance that a justice court judge ever undertake the responsibility himself of receiving any fine money. If that extreme occasion arises, he must give a written receipt, keep the money segregated and apart from his own, and at the very first opportunity deliver it to the justice court clerk with an explanation of why he received it himself.” Id.

must prove his indigency. Ake, 470 U.S. at 70, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Here, the trial court's order assigning Isham a public defender clearly indicates that he was financially unable to pay for an attorney, and the case proceeded on the basis that Isham was indigent." Id.

for the public defender's office. Section 25-32-7 provides that: The public defender shall be provided with office space, secretarial assistance, and all reasonable expenses of operating the office, at least equal to or more than the county prosecuting attorney, or the district attorney if the public defender represents the entire circuit court district. The compensation and expenses of the public defender's office shall be paid by the county or counties if two (2) or more counties are acting jointly. The funds shall be paid upon allowance by the board of supervisors by order spread upon the minutes of the board. Also, § 99-15-17, in pertinent part provides “[t]he fees and expenses [of counsel for indigents] as allowed by the appropriate judge shall be paid by the county treasurer out of the general fund of the county in which the prosecution was commenced.” Quitman I, 807 So.2d at 407. Quitman v. State, 910 So.2d at 1035. Mississippi's per-capita spending rate on public defense is $4.15. It is the lowest in the country, $7.31 lower than the national average. As a result, the county funded part-time lawyers continuously lack funding to conduct the most basic investigations, to conduct legal research, or to hire experts, yet another clear violation of Gideon and Strickland. In many counties, hiring an investigator or a psychiatrist in a non-death penalty case is only possible if the lawyer pays for it out of his or her own pocket. Indigent defense lawyers must handle their own appeals, often without more compensation. While attorneys representing defendants are entitled to receive payment for overhead, the amount of overhead allowed is in the presiding county judges' discretion, and is often times capped. Counties have set very low amounts as the maximum available for compensation of indigent counsel, and the judge must approve any excess funding. Unfortunately, judges are reluctant to develop a reputation for spending tax dollars on criminal defendants, so they often deny any such requests. As a result, the most basic investigations are not completed by the lawyer. The publication identified children as young as 14 who were sent to state prison for decades “after being represented by lawyers who did no investigation on their cases” and “who spent less time talking to [[the children] than a sales clerk might spend with a customer buying a pair of shoes.” Perisha Wallace, "No Equal Justice for the Poor: Mississippi's Failed Attempt to Honor the Right to Counsel Mandates,” 9 S. J. POL’Y & JUSTICE at 88-89. (Citations omitted).

into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain to her ability to make restitution or reparation. This record clearly shows that these matters were considered by Judge Allsbrook in his judgment ordering restitution. He knew defendant's age, her relationship to the victim, that she resided with her mother, that she was indigent for legal purposes, and that the victim's family had insurance of an uncertain amount in scope at the time of the sentencing hearing. The court's action in remitting the original fine and delegating the determination and scheduling of payments in restitution to the probation officer evidenced the trial judge's full recognition of the matters to be considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(d).

reasonably necessary for “the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. at 129, 357 S.E.2d at 696. Article V prohibits the judiciary from taking public monies without statutory authorization. But our statutes obligate counties and cities to provide physical facilities for the judicial system operating within their boundaries. N.C.G.S. § 7A–300(a)(11) (1989); N.C.G.S. § 7A–302 (1989). These facilities must be adequate to serve the functioning of the judiciary within the borders of those political subdivisions. Such adequacy necessarily includes safeguarding the constitutional rights of parties and ascertaining that parties' statutory rights—such as handicap access—are similarly protected. Although the statutes do not expressly pass the duty of providing adequate judicial facilities to the court in case of default of local authorities, the court has the inherent authority to direct local authorities to perform that duty.

proscribes turning the prosecution completely over to private counsel for interested parties, but it certainly did not proscribe all participation by such counsel. . . . The limits of such allowable assistance were also suggested: assistance may not extend to the point that “counsel for the private party [is] ... in control of the prosecution.” Id.8 We therefore read Young at least implicitly to approve (or certainly not to forbid) the practice of allowing private counsel for interested parties to participate formally with government counsel in the prosecution of contempt citations so long as that participation (1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution. As indicated, we find authority for this rule of limited participation at least implicit in Young and we think it wholly conformable to Young 's underlying principles. Accordingly, we adopt it as the appropriate rule governing the participation of private counsel for interested parties in contempt prosecutions.

840 (1974). Costs are imposed only at sentencing, so any convicted indigent defendant is given notice of the *102 appointment fee at the sentencing hearing and is also given an opportunity to be heard and object to the imposition of this cost. Therefore, the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied. Accordingly, the imposition of the appointment fee on convicted indigent defendants passes federal constitutional muster.

operating costs. It would be reasonable, for example, to require a defendant to pay the state for expenses incurred to provide him with court appointed counsel should he ever become financially able to pay. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). It would not however be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the state's overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him. People v. Baker, 37 Cal.App.3d 117, 112 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1974); State v. Mulvaney, 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972); Cf. People v. Teasdale, 335 Mich. 1, 55 N.W.2d 149 (1952).