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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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Missouri | Spencer v. Basinger, 562 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1978) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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After a prima facie showing of indigency has been made, an individual may not be incarcerated for nonpayment of fine and costs |
A prima facie showing of indigency has been made. Under such circumstances petitioner may not be confined further at this time for nonpayment of fine and costs. See Hendrix v. + See moreLark, 482 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. banc 1972). This is not to suggest that those who neglect or refuse to pay a fine may not be incarcerated for their refusal so to do within the constitutional standards described in Hendrix.
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Missouri | Hendrix v. Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Mo. 1972) | Other applicable caselaw | Prisoner's incarceration to satisfy payment of fines and costs levied upon her without giving indigent prisoner option of paying the same by installments denied her the equal protection of law. |
St. Louis must provide indigent defendants an opportunity to pay fines in reasonable installments and that portion of Sec. 773.070 of the Revised Code of the city providing the court + See moreshall not stay the payment of any fine and calling for its execution, i.e., immediate imprisonment in lieu of payment, *429 is unconstitutional under the above decisions.
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Enforcement |
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Missouri | Davis v. City of Charleston, Mo., 635 F.Supp. 197, 198-199 (1986) | upon raising inference that poverty is reason for non-payment rather than contempt, defendant is entitled to hearing on issue of indigency |
As stated in this Court's Memorandum and Order dated March 28, 1986: It must be remembered that the remedy § 560.031 intends is not an imprisonment for non-payment of fine + See moreas such, but a penalty by contempt of court for the failure to obey—either intentionally or by want of good-faith effort to comply—the sentence of the court.
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Ability to pay | |
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New Jersey | State v. Bolvito, 86 A.3d 131, 139 |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Less about protections for ability-to-pay determination, the case law has considered courts to broadly consider ability to pay |
When it assesses a defendant's ability to pay, the sentencing court should look beyond the defendant's current assets and anticipated income during the period of incarceration. The Legislature did not + See moreimpose time constraints on an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. If unpaid, the penalty does not evaporate at the conclusion of the defendant's custodial sentence or his or her period of parole supervision. To the extent that a defendant's educational background and employment history may affect his or her potential to achieve post-incarceration employment and a steady income, such factors may be relevant to the inquiry. For purposes of the sentencing court's determination, a defendant's ability to pay should not be measured only by current circumstances, but assessed over the long term
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 148, (NJ 2006) abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court is entitled to counsel |
In addition, without referencing our State Constitution, we held in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing + See moreimprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971); see also R. 7:3–2(b) (“If the court is satisfied that the defendant is indigent and that the defendant faces a consequence of magnitude ..., the court shall assign the municipal public defender to represent the defendant.”). In Rodriguez, we considered “the substantial loss of driving privileges” as one type of “serious consequence” that would warrant assigning counsel to an indigent defendant. 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216. We acknowledged “[t]he importance of counsel in an accusatorial system,” underscoring that in a case with “any complexities[,] the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself,” and that in a case without “complexities, his lack of legal representation may place him at a disadvantage.” ...We can find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court, termination of parental rights in family court, or tier classification in a Megan's Law proceeding would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not. Moreover, the indigent subject to incarceration for failure to pay support can hardly be distinguished from the indigent conferred with the right to counsel in an involuntary civil commitment hearing. We are persuaded that the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the assignment of counsel to indigent parents who are at risk of incarceration at child support enforcement hearings.
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 190 (1971) | Other applicable caselaw | defendants are allowed to pay fines in installments |
As we have said, there has been no bar to installment payments. The matter has rested in the court's discretion. The question now before us is whether the Federal Constitution + See morerequires an opportunity to pay a fine in installments.
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Ability to pay |