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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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New Jersey State v. Bolvito, 86 A.3d 131, 139
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Less about protections for ability-to-pay determination, the case law has considered courts to broadly consider ability to pay
When it assesses a defendant's ability to pay, the sentencing court should look beyond the defendant's current assets and anticipated income during the period of incarceration. The Legislature did not
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impose time constraints on an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. If unpaid, the penalty does not evaporate at the conclusion of the defendant's custodial sentence or his or her period of parole supervision. To the extent that a defendant's educational background and employment history may affect his or her potential to achieve post-incarceration employment and a steady income, such factors may be relevant to the inquiry. For purposes of the sentencing court's determination, a defendant's ability to pay should not be measured only by current circumstances, but assessed over the long term
Ability to pay
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New Jersey Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 148, (NJ 2006) abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court is entitled to counsel
In addition, without referencing our State Constitution, we held in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing
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imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971); see also R. 7:3–2(b) (“If the court is satisfied that the defendant is indigent and that the defendant faces a consequence of magnitude ..., the court shall assign the municipal public defender to represent the defendant.”). In Rodriguez, we considered “the substantial loss of driving privileges” as one type of “serious consequence” that would warrant assigning counsel to an indigent defendant. 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216. We acknowledged “[t]he importance of counsel in an accusatorial system,” underscoring that in a case with “any complexities[,] the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself,” and that in a case without “complexities, his lack of legal representation may place him at a disadvantage.” ...We can find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court, termination of parental rights in family court, or tier classification in a Megan's Law proceeding would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not. Moreover, the indigent subject to incarceration for failure to pay support can hardly be distinguished from the indigent conferred with the right to counsel in an involuntary civil commitment hearing. We are persuaded that the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the assignment of counsel to indigent parents who are at risk of incarceration at child support enforcement hearings.
Ability to pay
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New Jersey State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 190 (1971) Other applicable caselaw defendants are allowed to pay fines in installments
As we have said, there has been no bar to installment payments. The matter has rested in the court's discretion. The question now before us is whether the Federal Constitution
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requires an opportunity to pay a fine in installments. 
Ability to pay
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Missouri Spencer v. Basinger, 562 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1978)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
After a prima facie showing of indigency has been made, an individual may not be incarcerated for nonpayment of fine and costs
A prima facie showing of indigency has been made. Under such circumstances petitioner may not be confined further at this time for nonpayment of fine and costs. See Hendrix v.
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Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. banc 1972). This is not to suggest that those who neglect or refuse to pay a fine may not be incarcerated for their refusal so to do within the constitutional standards described in Hendrix.
Enforcement
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Missouri Hendrix v. Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Mo. 1972) Other applicable caselaw Prisoner's incarceration to satisfy payment of fines and costs levied upon her without giving indigent prisoner option of paying the same by installments denied her the equal protection of law.
St. Louis must provide indigent defendants an opportunity to pay fines in reasonable installments and that portion of Sec. 773.070 of the Revised Code of the city providing the court
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shall not stay the payment of any fine and calling for its execution, i.e., immediate imprisonment in lieu of payment, *429 is unconstitutional under the above decisions.
Enforcement
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Missouri Davis v. City of Charleston, Mo., 635 F.Supp. 197, 198-199 (1986) upon raising inference that poverty is reason for non-payment rather than contempt, defendant is entitled to hearing on issue of indigency
As stated in this Court's Memorandum and Order dated March 28, 1986: It must be remembered that the remedy § 560.031 intends is not an imprisonment for non-payment of fine
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as such, but a penalty by contempt of court for the failure to obey—either intentionally or by want of good-faith effort to comply—the sentence of the court.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Wisconsin State v. Ramel, 743 N.W.2d 502, 510 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
None. Case law instructs courts to look to the guidelines listed in the American Bar Association's Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures.
The court "require[s] that the court, by reference to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the sentence's component parts promote the sentencing objectives. By stating this linkage on the
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record, courts will produce sentences that can be more easily reviewed for a proper exercise of discretion." Id. at 507. “In further reliance on its earlier holding in Pedersen, the Will court noted: In Pedersen, we set out the following procedure to be followed in cases where the defendant claims he is unable to pay a fine: (1) We encouraged trial courts to follow a practice of ascertaining the defendant's ability to pay a fine at the time of sentencing. At this time the court should determine an amount and payment schedule in keeping with the defendant's means. (2) If, thereafter, the defendant is unable to pay the fine imposed, he has the burden to apply to the court for relief. Will, 84 Wis.2d at 403–04, 267 N.W.2d 357." "Kuechler was remanded to the trial court because the defendant's ability to pay the fine imposed *671 had not been determined, although he raised the issue in his post conviction motion, id., ¶ 13, and the court characterized as “unsatisfactory” the evidence in the record of inability to pay, id., ¶ 14. On remand, the trial court was reminded of the supreme court's instructions in Pedersen and Iglesias, which instructions relied upon the American Bar Association Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures: (c) In determining whether to impose a fine and its amount, the court should consider: (i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of a fine will impose, with due regard to his other obligations; (ii) the ability of the defendant to pay a fine on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; (iii) the extent to which payment of a fine will interfere with the ability of the defendant to make any ordered restitution or reparation to the victim of the crime; and (iv) whether there are particular reasons which make a fine appropriate as a deterrent to the offense involved or appropriate as a corrective measure for the defendant." State v. Ramel, 743 N.W.2d 502, 510
Ability to pay
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Wisconsin City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 517 N.W.2d 689, 697-98 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Collections of fines and fees by the court are permitted so long as their collection is not "clearly illegal."
By enacting §§ 800.09 and 800.095, STATS., the legislature explicitly granted municipal courts the authority to suspend drivers' licenses. Whether that constitutes a lawful exercise of police power depends on
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whether it is rationally related to furthering a proper public purpose. See State v. McManus, 152 Wis.2d 113, 130, 447 N.W.2d 654, 660 (Ct.App.1989). That is determined by a two-step analysis. First, we consider whether the statutes promote a proper public purpose. Id. Second, we determine whether the statutory scheme is reasonably related to the accomplishment of that purpose.” City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 517 N.W.2d at 696-97. “Courts must not interfere with the municipal exercise of police power unless the exercise is clearly illegal. J & N Corp. v. City of Green Bay, 28 Wis.2d 583, 585, 137 N.W.2d 434, 436 (1965). As the supreme court explained: Municipalities glean their powers from the state constitution and statutes. Under sec. 62.11(5), STATS., municipal legislative bodies are granted the power to act for the government and good order of the city, for its commercial benefit, and for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, and may carry out [their] powers by license, regulation, suppression, borrowing of money, tax levy, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, confiscation, and other necessary or convenient means. The powers hereby conferred shall be in addition to all other grants, and shall be limited only by express language.” City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore at 697. Conceivably, this rule is applicable to all state and local courts in the state of Wisconsin.
Revenue flow
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Wisconsin Will v. State, 267 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Wis. S. Ct. 1978). Other applicable case law
“[T]he Court held that the equal protection clause restricts the state's power to collect a fine from a defendant without the means to pay. We have previously held that: “What
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these cases (Williams, Morris, and Tate ) teach is that one who has been convicted of a crime and fined is not to be imprisoned in satisfaction of the fine or in lieu thereof if he is unable to pay the fine.” State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis.2d 286, 289, 201 N.W.2d 778, 780 (1972). Under the Williams, Morris, and Tate rationale, no equal protection violation occurs when an indigent offender is originally sentenced to confinement; for when he is originally sentenced to confinement, he is being punished for the crime. But once a sentencing judge has determined a fine to be the appropriate penalty, a defendant who is incarcerated merely because he is without the means to pay the fine is being incarcerated not for the crime but for his poverty, and such incarceration is illegal. On the other hand, when an indigent defender upon whom a fine has been imposed lacks the diligence to meet a reasonable payment schedule, his refusal to pay the fine results from contumacy and not indigence, and incarceration is permissible to punish the refusal to pay.” “But once the sentencing court determines that a fine is an appropriate sanction under the circumstances and that the defendant has the ability to pay it, an indigent offender should be accorded a fair method of paying his fine. Though in Pedersen this court declined to require the trial court to use the installment method when dealing with indigent offenders holding that a future date for total payment in lieu of payment in installments is acceptable, some commentators on sentencing have observed that in almost every case imprisonment can be avoided by allowing the indigent to pay his fine over time. We encourage trial courts to use the installment method, since a simple installment checkoff system at the trial court level would not be difficult to establish.” Id. at 360. “[W]e find no authority, either in the statutes or our cases, for the permanent suspension of a sentence. As long as the defendant is afforded a reasonable payment schedule and as long as he is not imprisoned for his inability to pay the fine, we find no constitutional bar to the state's attempting to collect a fine for an indeterminate period of time.” Id. at 361.
Enforcement