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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Missouri Spencer v. Basinger, 562 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1978)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
After a prima facie showing of indigency has been made, an individual may not be incarcerated for nonpayment of fine and costs
A prima facie showing of indigency has been made. Under such circumstances petitioner may not be confined further at this time for nonpayment of fine and costs. See Hendrix v.
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Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. banc 1972). This is not to suggest that those who neglect or refuse to pay a fine may not be incarcerated for their refusal so to do within the constitutional standards described in Hendrix.
Enforcement
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Missouri Hendrix v. Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Mo. 1972) Other applicable caselaw Prisoner's incarceration to satisfy payment of fines and costs levied upon her without giving indigent prisoner option of paying the same by installments denied her the equal protection of law.
St. Louis must provide indigent defendants an opportunity to pay fines in reasonable installments and that portion of Sec. 773.070 of the Revised Code of the city providing the court
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shall not stay the payment of any fine and calling for its execution, i.e., immediate imprisonment in lieu of payment, *429 is unconstitutional under the above decisions.
Enforcement
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Missouri Davis v. City of Charleston, Mo., 635 F.Supp. 197, 198-199 (1986) upon raising inference that poverty is reason for non-payment rather than contempt, defendant is entitled to hearing on issue of indigency
As stated in this Court's Memorandum and Order dated March 28, 1986: It must be remembered that the remedy § 560.031 intends is not an imprisonment for non-payment of fine
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as such, but a penalty by contempt of court for the failure to obey—either intentionally or by want of good-faith effort to comply—the sentence of the court.
Ability to pay
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North Carolina State v. Hunter, 315 N.C. 371, 376 (1986)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
State law requires that NC courts "take into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain
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to her ability to make restitution or reparation" when ordering restitution.
We do not interpret N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343 to require the trial judge to find and enter facts when imposing a judgment of probation. Rather it requires the court to take
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into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain to her ability to make restitution or reparation. This record clearly shows that these matters were considered by Judge Allsbrook in his judgment ordering restitution. He knew defendant's age, her relationship to the victim, that she resided with her mother, that she was indigent for legal purposes, and that the victim's family had insurance of an uncertain amount in scope at the time of the sentencing hearing. The court's action in remitting the original fine and delegating the determination and scheduling of payments in restitution to the probation officer evidenced the trial judge's full recognition of the matters to be considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(d).
Ability to pay
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North Carolina Matter of Alamance Cty. Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 99 (1991) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Not explicitly, but it may be limited on a case-by-case basis
We hold that when inaction by those exercising legislative authority threatens fiscally to undermine the integrity of the judiciary, a court may invoke its inherent power to do what is
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reasonably necessary for “the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. at 129, 357 S.E.2d at 696. Article V prohibits the judiciary from taking public monies without statutory authorization. But our statutes obligate counties and cities to provide physical facilities for the judicial system operating within their boundaries. N.C.G.S. § 7A–300(a)(11) (1989); N.C.G.S. § 7A–302 (1989). These facilities must be adequate to serve the functioning of the judiciary within the borders of those political subdivisions. Such adequacy necessarily includes safeguarding the constitutional rights of parties and ascertaining that parties' statutory rights—such as handicap access—are similarly protected. Although the statutes do not expressly pass the duty of providing adequate judicial facilities to the court in case of default of local authorities, the court has the inherent authority to direct local authorities to perform that duty.
Revenue flow
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North Carolina Pers. v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 662–63 (4th Cir. 1988)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
Private counsel for interested parties may co-prosecute cases with government counsel when such participation "(1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate
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role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution."
The issue here is whether and, if so, to what extent, private counsel for interested parties may be authorized to participate with government counsel in such a prosecution. Young flatly
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proscribes turning the prosecution completely over to private counsel for interested parties, but it certainly did not proscribe all participation by such counsel. . . . The limits of such allowable assistance were also suggested: assistance may not extend to the point that “counsel for the private party [is] ... in control of the prosecution.” Id.8 We therefore read Young at least implicitly to approve (or certainly not to forbid) the practice of allowing private counsel for interested parties to participate formally with government counsel in the prosecution of contempt citations so long as that participation (1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution. As indicated, we find authority for this rule of limited participation at least implicit in Young and we think it wholly conformable to Young 's underlying principles. Accordingly, we adopt it as the appropriate rule governing the participation of private counsel for interested parties in contempt prosecutions.
Transparency
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North Carolina State v. Webb, 358 N.C. 92, 101–02 (2004) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Yes, a defendant may only be held liable for counsel fees in criminal trials if the defendant is convicted.
A convicted defendant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a valid judgment for costs can be entered. State v. Crews, 284 N.C. 427, 201 S.E.2d
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840 (1974). Costs are imposed only at sentencing, so any convicted indigent defendant is given notice of the *102 appointment fee at the sentencing hearing and is also given an opportunity to be heard and object to the imposition of this cost. Therefore, the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied. Accordingly, the imposition of the appointment fee on convicted indigent defendants passes federal constitutional muster.
Fines and fees
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North Carolina Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 633–34 (1976) Other applicable case law Though a defendant may not be held liable for the fees of court appointed counsel after a conviction, he may be held liable for restitution for high costs.
A state or a local agency can be the recipient of restitution where the offense charged results in particular damages or loss to it over and above its normal
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operating costs. It would be reasonable, for example, to require a defendant to pay the state for expenses incurred to provide him with court appointed counsel should he ever become financially able to pay. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). It would not however be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the state's overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him. People v. Baker, 37 Cal.App.3d 117, 112 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1974); State v. Mulvaney, 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972); Cf. People v. Teasdale, 335 Mich. 1, 55 N.W.2d 149 (1952).
Fines and fees
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West Virginia State v. Murrell, 201 W. Va. 648, 649–50, 499 S.E.2d 870, 871–72 (1997).
Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Haught, 179 W.Va. 557, 371 S.E.2d 54 (1988).
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
(1) While there is no prohibition against the imposition of the maximum penalty prescribed by law, indigent defendants may not be incarcerated solely because of their inability to pay court-ordered
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fines or costs. (2) The court may impose of a statutory fine without determination of ability to pay, but before a trial court conditions its recommendation for a defendant's parole upon the defendant's payment of statutory fines, costs and attorney's fees, the trial court must consider the financial resources of the defendant, the defendant's ability to pay and the nature of the burden that the payment of such costs will impose upon the defendant.
"An individual is not excused from the imposition of the maximum sentence allowed under a statute simply because he is indigent, even if that sentence includes the imposition of fines
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pursuant to statute. Consistent with the principles of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), and *650 **872 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), however, while there is no prohibition against the imposition of the maximum penalty prescribed by law, indigent defendants may not be incarcerated solely because of their inability to pay court-ordered fines or costs." State v. Murrell, 201 W. Va. 648, 649–50, 499 S.E.2d 870, 871–72 (1997).
Ability to pay
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West Virginia W. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3 Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? No. West Virginia's Constitution allows the Court of Appeals to impose binding state-wide rules.
“The court shall have power to promulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts of the State relating to writs, warrants, process, practice
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and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law.”
Enforcement
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West Virginia See generally §59-1-1 to §59-1-39. W. Va. Code §59-1-14.
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
The Court, Clerk of Court, Sheriff and Probation Dept can collect fines. Most fines and fees go into the general revenue fund (either state or county), but the West
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Virginia Deputy Sheriff Retirement Fundt fund receives a small amount from certain collections (see §59-1-14).
Revenue flow
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West Virginia W. Va. Code § 29-21-16 Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
No, not under the state constitution. However, state statutory law provides that "court shall not order a person to pay costs unless the person is able to pay without
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undue hardship."
(g) In the circumstances and manner set forth below, circuit judges may order repayment to the state, through the office of the clerk of the circuit court having jurisdiction over
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the proceedings, of the costs of representation provided under this article:(1) In every case in which services are provided to an indigent person and an adverse judgment has been rendered against such person, the court may require that person, and in juvenile cases, may require the juvenile's parents or custodian, to pay as costs the compensation of appointed counsel, the expenses of the defense and such other fees and costs as authorized by statute. (2) The court shall not order a person to pay costs unless the person is able to pay without undue hardship. In determining the amount and method of repayment of costs, the court shall take account of the financial resources of the person, the person's ability to pay and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. The fact that the court initially determines, at the time of a case's conclusion, that it is not proper to order the repayment of costs does not preclude the court from subsequently ordering repayment should the person's financial circumstances change. (3) When a person is ordered to repay costs, the court may order payment to be made forthwith or within a specified period of time or in specified installments. If a person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, an order for repayment of costs is not enforceable during the period of imprisonment unless the court expressly finds, at the time of sentencing, that the person has sufficient assets to pay the amounts ordered to be paid or finds there is a reasonable likelihood the person will acquire the necessary assets in the foreseeable future. (4) A person who has been ordered to repay costs, and who is not in contumacious default in the payment thereof, may at any time petition the sentencing court for modification of the repayment order. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that continued payment of the amount ordered will impose undue hardship on the person or the person's dependents, the court may modify the method or amount of payment. (5) When a person ordered to pay costs is also placed on probation or imposition or execution of sentence is suspended, the court may make the repayment of costs a condition of probation or suspension of sentence.
Ability to pay
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West Virginia State v. Stamm, 222 W. Va. 276, 281, 664 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2008) Other applicable case law In criminal failure to pay support cases, burden of reasonable ability to pay remains with the state.
"Accordingly, we now hold that, insofar as W. Va. Code § 61-5-29(3) (1999) (Repl. Vol. 2005) shifts to a defendant the burden of disproving a material element of the State's
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case [here, defendant's reasonable ability to provide was an element in 61-5-29(2), but reasonable ability to provide was also an affirmative defense in 61-5-29(3)], in violation of the due process clauses found in Article III, Section 10, of the Constitution of West Virginia, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that individual provision, severed from the remainder of W. Va. Code § 61-5-29, is unconstitutional and unenforceable."