Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
Case Law
Keyword search across all of the laws in the states. Subject-area tabs above allow you to narrow results. Click the advanced search for further refinement.
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When does this apply
| State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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Missouri | Spencer v. Basinger, 562 S.W.2d 350, 353 (Mo. 1978) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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After a prima facie showing of indigency has been made, an individual may not be incarcerated for nonpayment of fine and costs |
A prima facie showing of indigency has been made. Under such circumstances petitioner may not be confined further at this time for nonpayment of fine and costs. See Hendrix v. + See moreLark, 482 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. banc 1972). This is not to suggest that those who neglect or refuse to pay a fine may not be incarcerated for their refusal so to do within the constitutional standards described in Hendrix.
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Missouri | Hendrix v. Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Mo. 1972) | Other applicable caselaw | Prisoner's incarceration to satisfy payment of fines and costs levied upon her without giving indigent prisoner option of paying the same by installments denied her the equal protection of law. |
St. Louis must provide indigent defendants an opportunity to pay fines in reasonable installments and that portion of Sec. 773.070 of the Revised Code of the city providing the court + See moreshall not stay the payment of any fine and calling for its execution, i.e., immediate imprisonment in lieu of payment, *429 is unconstitutional under the above decisions.
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Missouri | Davis v. City of Charleston, Mo., 635 F.Supp. 197, 198-199 (1986) | upon raising inference that poverty is reason for non-payment rather than contempt, defendant is entitled to hearing on issue of indigency |
As stated in this Court's Memorandum and Order dated March 28, 1986: It must be remembered that the remedy § 560.031 intends is not an imprisonment for non-payment of fine + See moreas such, but a penalty by contempt of court for the failure to obey—either intentionally or by want of good-faith effort to comply—the sentence of the court.
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Ability to pay | |
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Texas | Rusk v. State, 440 S.W.3d 694, 702 (Tex. App. 2013) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Court must inquire into defendant's ability to pay before revoking probation and the burden of proof is on the state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant + See morewillfully refused to pay financial obligation.
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"The Texas ability-to-pay statute imposes an evidentiary burden on the State while Bearden imposes a mandatory judicial directive to inquire into a defendant's ability to pay." | Ability to pay |
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Texas | Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 517–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), reh'g denied (Sept. 16, 2015),, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1188, 194 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2016) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | Court imposition of costs is not unconstitutional under federal or state constitutional law as long as the money collected will go toward a "criminal justice purpose" |
"[T]he statute under which court costs are assessed (or an interconnected statute) provides for an allocation of such court costs to be expended for legitimate criminal justice purposes, then the + See morestatute allows for a constitutional application that will not render the courts tax gatherers in violation of the separation of powers clause. A criminal justice purpose is one that relates to the administration of our criminal justice system. Whether a criminal justice purpose is “legitimate” is a question to be answered on a statute-by-statute/case-by-case basis."
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Fines and fees |
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Texas | Acosta v. State, 233 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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There is no case law addressing this question; however, Texas courts have stated that a conflict of interest exists if counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his + See moreclient's interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests. By analogy, then, a conflict of interest may also exist when law enforcement and/or courts are required to to make a choice between advancing justice and fair adjudication or advancing other interests (perhaps their own).
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"An actual conflict of interest exists if counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his client's interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel's own) + See moreto the detriment of his client's interest.”
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Revenue flow |
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Texas | Gross v. State, 279 S.W.3d 791, 793–94 (Tex. App. 2007) abrogated for other reasons by Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2009) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | No, so long, as the defendant has the ability to off-set the State's expenses |
"nonindigent defendant is required to pay for counsel. To require an indigent to reimburse the county, to the extent he is able, for the expense of furnished counsel tends to + See moreput indigents and nonindigents on the same basis and is consistent with due process. The State of Texas provides an important service in providing legal services to those indigent citizens who cannot afford to pay for their own defense. Because of this service provided to indigents, the State has a significant interest in assuring that persons with financial resources pay for their own representation and do not take a free ride at the expense of its taxpayers. Thus, it is not an inherent violation of due process for the State to take reasonable steps to collect on expenditures made on behalf of those who have the ability to off-set the State's expenses."
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Fines and fees |