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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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North Dakota State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
While the North Dakota Supreme Court has not expressly delineated what the ND constitution requires for an ability to pay hearing, it applied Fuller in holding that the current recoupment
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statute is valid.
Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the
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defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
Ability to pay
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North Dakota State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? As noted above, Kottenbroch indicates that a hearing is required.
Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the
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defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
Fines and fees
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North Dakota State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1978) Other applicable case law Defendant who agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain has no right to ability to pay determination under N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08.
After serious deliberation, we conclude that the provisions of s 12.1-32-08, NDCC, apply in situations where the defendant either is found guilty or pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and
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the amounts or the issues of restitution or reparation are uncertain or are in dispute. However, we do not believe it applies where restitution or reparation was resolved by agreement with the defendant through plea-bargaining procedures even though the specific amount is not known and is to be determined later. When a defendant agrees to pay for the damage he caused and has a general idea of the amount, but not the specific amount in dollars and cents, which is to be determined later, he cannot later claim in the absence of fraud, that he was not made aware of the amount or that he did not agree to the amount. After a voluntary agreement has been reached on the issues of restitution and reparation it would be a useless gesture to proceed under s 12.1-32-08, NDCC. We do not believe that justice requires the performance of an idle act (s 31-11-05(23), NDCC), which it would be to require a restitution or reparation hearing after the defendant has agreed to make restitution or reparation, as the case may be.
Ability to pay
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North Dakota State v. Nordahl, 680 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 2004) Other applicable case law Where defendant agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain, probation can be revoked for failure to pay restitution, even if defendant was genuinely unable to pay
Nordahl's situation is sufficiently distinguishable from the Bearden case. In Bearden, the defendant did not agree to the restitution as part of a plea agreement; rather, restitution was imposed by
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the court as a part of Bearden's sentence. Id. at 662, 103 S.Ct. 2064. . . . The crux of the decision in Bearden rested on good faith. Id. Unlike Bearden, but similar to the defendant in Mitchell, Nordahl knew his financial situation before he entered into the plea agreement with the State's Attorney. Nordahl was in a position to know the nature and extent of his finances and to evaluate his ability to pay the restitution obligation. Prior to entering the plea agreement, Nordahl knew of the encumbrances on his farm and other property. In his affidavit, Nordahl stated it was his intention to sell the bus to satisfy a portion of the restitution and to sell part of his farm property to satisfy the rest of the obligation. Presumably, Nordahl was aware that the outstanding obligations to the bank would go unfulfilled if he paid the restitution obligation in full or, in the alternative, the bank would lose its collateral.
Ability to pay
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Washington State v. Curry, 118 Wash.2d 911, 915–16 (1992)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
If a judge imposes discretionary legal financial obligations, seven requirements must first be met
The following requirements must be met:1. Repayment must not be mandatory;2. Repayment may be imposed only on convicted defendants;3. Repayment may only be ordered if the defendant is or will
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be able to pay;4. The financial resources of the defendant must be taken into account;5. A repayment obligation may not be imposed if it appears there is no likelihood the defendant's indigency will end;6. The convicted person must be permitted to petition the court for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid portion; 7. The convicted person cannot be held in contempt for failure to repay if the default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the court order or a failure to make a good faith effort to make repayment.
Ability to pay
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Washington State v. Blank, 131 Wash.2d 230, 239-42 (1997) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
Yes, but they are incorporated into protections that do not directly speak to limitations on the state's ability to recoup fees, such as the defendant's inability to pay and the
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court's obligation to inquire into a defendant's ability to pay
the procedural guidelines required by the Constitution, and mandated by this court, need not be specifically enumerated in the statute so long as the courts adhere to those requirements…Moreover, common
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sense dictates that a determination of ability to pay and an inquiry into defendant's finances is not required before a recoupment order may be entered against an indigent defendant as it is nearly impossible to predict ability to pay over a period of 10 years or longer.6 However, we hold that before enforced collection or any sanction is imposed for nonpayment, there must be an inquiry into ability to pay. State v. Blank, 131 Wash.2d 230, 239-42 (1997)
Revenue flow
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Washington State v. Blazina, 182 Wash. 2d 827, 839, 344 P.3d 680, 685 (2015) Other applicable case law Imposition of discretionary fines and fees requires individualized inquiry into defendants ability to pay.
We hold that RCW 10.01.160(3) requires the record to reflect that the sentencing judge made an individualized inquiry into the defendant's current and future ability to pay before the court
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imposes LFOs. This inquiry also requires the court to consider important factors, such as incarceration and a defendant's other debts, including restitution, when determining a defendant's ability to pay. Because the records in this case do not show that the sentencing judges made this inquiry into either defendant's ability to pay, we remand the cases to the trial courts for new sentence hearings.
Ability to pay