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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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New Hampshire | State v. Haas, 155 N.H. 612, 613–14, 927 A.2d 1209, 1210 (2007) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Statute requiring defendant to reimburse State for costs of his legal representation did not violate constitutional right to substantive due process |
The purpose of the statute is to require that those who are financially able to do so, pay for a service that they received from the State. There is nothing + See moreillegitimate in the governmental interest in recouping costs expended for public defense whether or not the defendant is convicted. Moreover, the statutory scheme under RSA 604-A:9 is rationally related to this purpose in that it inquires into a defendant's *614 ability to pay and outlines procedures for recoupment orders, collection and appeal of such orders.
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Fines and fees |
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New Hampshire | State v. Fowlie, 138 N.H. 234, 236–37, 636 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1994) | Other applicable case law | If the defendant then demonstrates sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt, alternatives to imprisonment must be considered by the court before probation may be revoked and imprisonment ordered |
We held in Wallace that in a criminal contempt proceeding where a defendant introduces evidence of inability to pay, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's intentional + See morenoncompliance with the court's order. Probation violation, however, is not a criminal offense, and revocation requires only a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, of misplaced trust. . . The State's initial burden when, as here, it brings a petition, is to show that the defendant did not meet a condition of his sentence, in this case, the payment of restitution. The court then “must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay.” Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672, 103 S.Ct. at 2072. If the defendant then “demonstrate[s] sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt,” id. at 671, 103 S.Ct. at 2072, alternatives to imprisonment must be considered by the court before probation may be revoked and imprisonment ordered. Id. at 672, 103 S.Ct. at 2072.
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Ability to pay |
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Oregon | State v. Mickow, 277 Or.App. 497, 502 (2016) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Courts must determine that the defendant is or may be able to pay the fees, and take the financial resources of the defendant into account, as well as the nature + See moreof the burden that the fee obligation would place on that person
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Among the safeguards that were pivotal to the [Supreme] Court's conclusion [upholding Oregon's ability-to-pay determination post-Gideon] were the statutory requirements that the sentencing court must (1) determine that the defendant + See moreis or may be able to pay the fees; and (2) take the financial resources of the defendant into account, as well as the nature of the burden that the fee obligation would place on that person. Id. at 45, 53 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 2116.
State v. Mickow, 277 Or.App. 497, 502 (2016)
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Ability to pay |
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Oregon | Bobo v. Kulongoski, 338 Or. 111, 122 (2005) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? |
Unclear, and answer is unavailable as to courts, but a line of cases suggests that merely having a fund where assessed fees support state functions does not constitute a conflict + See moreof interest
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Considering the wording of Article IV, section 18, its history, and the case law surrounding it, we conclude that the question whether a bill is a “bill for raising revenue” + See moreentails two issues. The first is whether the bill collects or brings money into the treasury. If it does not, that is the end of the inquiry. If a bill does bring money into the treasury, the remaining question is whether the bill possesses the essential features of a bill levying a tax. As Northern Counties Trust makes clear, bills that assess a fee for a specific purpose are not “bills raising revenue” even though they collect or bring money into the treasury.
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Revenue flow |
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Oregon | State v. Fuller, 12 Or.App. 152, 158–59 (1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Yes, but such limits are predicated on the indigency of the defendant |
Thus, an indigent defendant is entitled to free counsel immediately (which is when he needs it), but may be later required to repay this cost if he ‘is or will + See morebe’ able to do so, that is, if he has ceased or likely will cease to be indigent. A defendant is not denied counsel while he is indigent, and he is required to repay appointed counsel's fee only if and when he is no longer indigent. If there is no likelihood that a defendant's indigency will end, a judgment for costs cannot be imposed. ORS 161.665(3).
State v. Fuller, 12 Or.App. 152, 158–59 (1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 40 (1974)
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Fines and fees |
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Oregon | State v. Goodenow, 251 Or.App. 139, 144–45 (2012) | Other applicable caselaw |
Courts are not limited by any numerical or proportionality requirement to seize the proceeds of a crime, in this case, all the earnings from a winning lottery ticket purchased using + See morean illegally obtained credit card
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Oregon's criminal forfeiture statutes do not limit the amount of property that may be forfeited as the proceeds of prohibited conduct. They do not require courts to determine whether a + See moreforfeiture of a defendant's property is proportional to the defendant's crime. ORS 131.585(1) (“The court shall enter judgment to the extent that the property is proceeds of the crime of conviction or of past prohibited conduct that is similar to the crime of conviction.”). (In that respect, the statutes treat the forfeiture of the proceeds of defendants' crimes differently from the forfeiture of instrumentalities of defendants' crimes. The statutes require courts to determine whether the forfeiture of an instrumentality of a defendant's crime, such as a vehicle or building used in the commission of a crime, is proportional to the crime and identify factors to consider in making that determination. ORS 131.585(2)(a)-(g).4)
State v. Goodenow, 251 Or.App. 139, 144–45 (2012)
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Enforcement |
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Wyoming | Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350), (WY 1993) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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With respect to imposing a surcharge on a defendant under Section 1-40-119, the court is required to find an ability to pay before ordering an assessment. |
We agree with Appellant that the court was required to find that he had [**28] an ability to pay before ordering the assessment. Murray v. State, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 110, *27-28, + See more855 P.2d 350, 359 (Wyo. 1993)
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Ability to pay |
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Wyoming | Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350), (Wyo. 1993) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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With respect to imposing restitution under Section 7-9-103(a) and 7-9-102, the court must only make a specific finding when the defendant does not have any ability to pay. |
Henceforth, the court must make a specific finding only when the defendant does not have a present or prospective ability to pay. Although the court is not required to specifically + See morefind that a defendant has the ability to pay, the record must still contain evidence to support the existence of a present or future ability to pay. Murray v. State, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 110, *26-27, 855 P.2d 350, 359 (Wyo. 1993)
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Ability to pay |
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Wyoming | Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 433, (Wyo. 1990) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | The court has the authority to require the defendant's payment of his legal fees. |
Under W.S. 7-6-106(d) (June 1987 Repl.) the courts have the authority to order a defendant to repay the state for the cost of defense services.
Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, + See more433, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119, *100 (Wyo. 1990)
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Fines and fees |