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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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North Carolina | State v. Hunter, 315 N.C. 371, 376 (1986) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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State law requires that NC courts "take into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain + See moreto her ability to make restitution or reparation" when ordering restitution.
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We do not interpret N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343 to require the trial judge to find and enter facts when imposing a judgment of probation. Rather it requires the court to take + See moreinto consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain to her ability to make restitution or reparation. This record clearly shows that these matters were considered by Judge Allsbrook in his judgment ordering restitution. He knew defendant's age, her relationship to the victim, that she resided with her mother, that she was indigent for legal purposes, and that the victim's family had insurance of an uncertain amount in scope at the time of the sentencing hearing. The court's action in remitting the original fine and delegating the determination and scheduling of payments in restitution to the probation officer evidenced the trial judge's full recognition of the matters to be considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(d).
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Ability to pay |
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North Carolina | Matter of Alamance Cty. Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 99 (1991) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | Not explicitly, but it may be limited on a case-by-case basis |
We hold that when inaction by those exercising legislative authority threatens fiscally to undermine the integrity of the judiciary, a court may invoke its inherent power to do what is + See morereasonably necessary for “the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. at 129, 357 S.E.2d at 696. Article V prohibits the judiciary from taking public monies without statutory authorization. But our statutes obligate counties and cities to provide physical facilities for the judicial system operating within their boundaries. N.C.G.S. § 7A–300(a)(11) (1989); N.C.G.S. § 7A–302 (1989). These facilities must be adequate to serve the functioning of the judiciary within the borders of those political subdivisions. Such adequacy necessarily includes safeguarding the constitutional rights of parties and ascertaining that parties' statutory rights—such as handicap access—are similarly protected. Although the statutes do not expressly pass the duty of providing adequate judicial facilities to the court in case of default of local authorities, the court has the inherent authority to direct local authorities to perform that duty.
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Revenue flow |
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North Carolina | Pers. v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 662–63 (4th Cir. 1988) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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Private counsel for interested parties may co-prosecute cases with government counsel when such participation "(1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate + See morerole to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution."
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The issue here is whether and, if so, to what extent, private counsel for interested parties may be authorized to participate with government counsel in such a prosecution. Young flatly + See moreproscribes turning the prosecution completely over to private counsel for interested parties, but it certainly did not proscribe all participation by such counsel. . . . The limits of such allowable assistance were also suggested: assistance may not extend to the point that “counsel for the private party [is] ... in control of the prosecution.” Id.8 We therefore read Young at least implicitly to approve (or certainly not to forbid) the practice of allowing private counsel for interested parties to participate formally with government counsel in the prosecution of contempt citations so long as that participation (1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution. As indicated, we find authority for this rule of limited participation at least implicit in Young and we think it wholly conformable to Young 's underlying principles. Accordingly, we adopt it as the appropriate rule governing the participation of private counsel for interested parties in contempt prosecutions.
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Transparency |
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North Carolina | State v. Webb, 358 N.C. 92, 101–02 (2004) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Yes, a defendant may only be held liable for counsel fees in criminal trials if the defendant is convicted. |
A convicted defendant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a valid judgment for costs can be entered. State v. Crews, 284 N.C. 427, 201 S.E.2d + See more840 (1974). Costs are imposed only at sentencing, so any convicted indigent defendant is given notice of the *102 appointment fee at the sentencing hearing and is also given an opportunity to be heard and object to the imposition of this cost. Therefore, the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied. Accordingly, the imposition of the appointment fee on convicted indigent defendants passes federal constitutional muster.
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Fines and fees |
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North Carolina | Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 633–34 (1976) | Other applicable case law | Though a defendant may not be held liable for the fees of court appointed counsel after a conviction, he may be held liable for restitution for high costs. |
A state or a local agency can be the recipient of restitution where the offense charged results in particular damages or loss to it over and above its normal + See moreoperating costs. It would be reasonable, for example, to require a defendant to pay the state for expenses incurred to provide him with court appointed counsel should he ever become financially able to pay. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). It would not however be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the state's overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him. People v. Baker, 37 Cal.App.3d 117, 112 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1974); State v. Mulvaney, 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972); Cf. People v. Teasdale, 335 Mich. 1, 55 N.W.2d 149 (1952).
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Fines and fees |
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Tennessee |
State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 723 (Tenn. 2002); State v. Smith, 898 S.W.2d 742, 747 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); Poole v. City of Chattanooga, No. E199901965COAR3CV, 2000 WL 310564, + See moreat *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2000)
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Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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In imposing fines, courts must consider the defendant's ability to pay, prior criminal history, potential for rehabilitation, financial means, and other mitigating and enhancing factors. The burden is on the + See moredefendant to prove a present inability to pay.
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The trial court's imposition of a fine, within the limits set by the jury, is to be based upon the factors provided by the 1989 Sentencing Act, which include the + See moredefendant's ability to pay that fine, and other factors of judgment involved in setting the total sentence. Trial and appellate courts must also consider other factors, including prior history, potential for rehabilitation, financial means, and mitigating and enhancing factors that are relevant to an appropriate, overall sentence. The seriousness of a conviction offense may also support a punitive fine.
[T]he burden is on the contemner to prove inability to pay
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Ability to pay |
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Tennessee | State v. Rose, No. C.C.A. 3, 1989 WL 22804, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 15, 1989) (Daughtrey, J., concurring in part) | Does the states separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? |
To some degree. Only the legislature can establish that conduct is criminal and is subject to a fine. Courts cannot impose a fine for behavior that the legislature has not + See morecriminalized
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The power to declare conduct to be criminal and to set forth the gradation of penalties for various offenses is a matter wholly within the power and discretion of the + See morelegislature, which discretion, exercised within constitutional limits, is not subject to review by the courts.
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Fines and fees |
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Tennessee | State v. Smith, No. C.C.A. 86-121-III, 1986 WL 10893 (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 3, 1986) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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This has not been explicitly addressed by courts. However, in the right-to-counsel context, Tennesee generally recognizes that conflicts of interests should be avoided where they are likely to occur. Furthermore, + See morein at least one instance, the Tennesee Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized that conflicts might arise regarding fines and law enforcement.
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Unless it appears that there is good cause to believe no conflict of interest is likely to arise, the court shall take such measures as may be appropriate to protect + See moreeach defendant's right to counsel. "There is in the record an interesting letter from this assistant district attorney general to the defendants' attorney in which he asserts there is a conflict of interest because the state wished to talk with four of the accused, out of the presence of counsel, to explain the possibility of entering a nolle as to one or more of these persons and agreeing to a fine upon a guilty plea as to the others. If the state has no case against these people they could and should move to dismiss the charges without need to consult with them, either with or without counsel present."
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Enforcement |
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Tennessee | State v. Miller, No. W200200640CCAR3CD, 2003 WL 1618070, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 28, 2003) | Are there limits to the states ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
In making its ability-to-pay determination, the court can require a defendant to pay as much as it determines the defendant is able to pay. It can modify this order if + See morethere is a change in the defendant's financial circumstances.
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"If the court appoints counsel to represent an accused in a felony case under this section or in a misdemeanor case as required by law, but finds the accused is + See morefinancially able to defray a portion or all of the cost of the accused's representation, the court shall enter an order directing the party to pay into the registry of the clerk of such court such sum as the court determines the accused is able to pay. Such sum shall be subject to execution as any other judgment and may also be made a condition of a discharge from probation. The court may provide for payments to be made at intervals, which the court shall establish, and upon such terms and conditions as are fair and just. The court may also modify its order when there has been a change in circumstances of the accused."
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Ability to pay |
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Tennessee | Poole v. City of Chattanooga, No. E199901965COAR3CV, 2000 WL 310564, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2000) | Other applicable caselaw | Defendants can be imprisoned for failure to pay fines if the court determines the person being imprisoned has the ability to pay the fine. | "[I]mprisonment for failure to pay a fine, which is allowed under T.C.A. § 29-9-104, so long as the person being imprisoned has the ability to pay the fine." | Ability to pay |
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Tennessee | State v. Dubrock, 649 S.W.2d 602 (Tenn.Crim.App.1983) | Defendant is entitled to ability-to-pay hearing whenever they claim indigency. |
"We think it is clear from the plain meaning of the statute that an indigency hearing must be held whenever a criminal defendant claims that he is financially unable to + See moreretain counsel. Furthermore, the legislature has placed no limits on the word whenever. Thus, an indigency hearing is required at any point that the defendant claims indigency."
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Ability to pay |