Below are the cases that meet your search criteria.

27 Results

Export results to Excel

State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
+ See more
authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
+ See more
is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
+ See more
is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

North Dakota State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
While the North Dakota Supreme Court has not expressly delineated what the ND constitution requires for an ability to pay hearing, it applied Fuller in holding that the current recoupment
+ See more
statute is valid.
Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the
+ See more
defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

North Dakota State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? As noted above, Kottenbroch indicates that a hearing is required.
Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the
+ See more
defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
Fines and fees
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

North Dakota State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1978) Other applicable case law Defendant who agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain has no right to ability to pay determination under N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08.
After serious deliberation, we conclude that the provisions of s 12.1-32-08, NDCC, apply in situations where the defendant either is found guilty or pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and
+ See more
the amounts or the issues of restitution or reparation are uncertain or are in dispute. However, we do not believe it applies where restitution or reparation was resolved by agreement with the defendant through plea-bargaining procedures even though the specific amount is not known and is to be determined later. When a defendant agrees to pay for the damage he caused and has a general idea of the amount, but not the specific amount in dollars and cents, which is to be determined later, he cannot later claim in the absence of fraud, that he was not made aware of the amount or that he did not agree to the amount. After a voluntary agreement has been reached on the issues of restitution and reparation it would be a useless gesture to proceed under s 12.1-32-08, NDCC. We do not believe that justice requires the performance of an idle act (s 31-11-05(23), NDCC), which it would be to require a restitution or reparation hearing after the defendant has agreed to make restitution or reparation, as the case may be.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

North Dakota State v. Nordahl, 680 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 2004) Other applicable case law Where defendant agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain, probation can be revoked for failure to pay restitution, even if defendant was genuinely unable to pay
Nordahl's situation is sufficiently distinguishable from the Bearden case. In Bearden, the defendant did not agree to the restitution as part of a plea agreement; rather, restitution was imposed by
+ See more
the court as a part of Bearden's sentence. Id. at 662, 103 S.Ct. 2064. . . . The crux of the decision in Bearden rested on good faith. Id. Unlike Bearden, but similar to the defendant in Mitchell, Nordahl knew his financial situation before he entered into the plea agreement with the State's Attorney. Nordahl was in a position to know the nature and extent of his finances and to evaluate his ability to pay the restitution obligation. Prior to entering the plea agreement, Nordahl knew of the encumbrances on his farm and other property. In his affidavit, Nordahl stated it was his intention to sell the bus to satisfy a portion of the restitution and to sell part of his farm property to satisfy the rest of the obligation. Presumably, Nordahl was aware that the outstanding obligations to the bank would go unfulfilled if he paid the restitution obligation in full or, in the alternative, the bank would lose its collateral.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio State v. Meyer, 124 Ohio App. 3d 373, 377 (1997)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
An ability-to-pay hearing is not required when a fine is merely imposed. Rather, it is only required when the trial court decides to incarcerate the defendant for failure to pay.
+ See more
Defendant is entitled to representation and an opportunity to present evidence.
We hold, therefore, that R.C. 2947.14(A) did not require a hearing in the present case because the trial court merely imposed a fine. Because the trial court has not yet
+ See more
sought to enforce the fine with incarceration, the duty to hold a hearing under R.C. 2947.14(A) is not triggered. We note, further, that payment of the fine in this case was technically a condition of Meyer's probation, and therefore, should he be unable to pay and his probation sought to be revoked, he is entitled to a hearing under Crim.R. 32.3. In either case, the hearing requirement is conditioned upon the trial court's decision to incarcerate him.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio State ex rel. Hague v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2009-Ohio-6140, ¶ 18, 123 Ohio St. 3d 489, 493 (Ohio 2009) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? No. In fact, one case found that county commissioners violated the separation-of-powers doctrine for not funding courts when the court could not collect enough revenue from cases
"The board and commissioners claim that they have rebutted the presumed reasonableness of the requesting funding because Judge Hague failed to make sufficient operational changes to reduce the courts' budget,
+ See more
failed to cooperate with the budget process in a timely manner, and has sufficient money to operate the courts for the remainder of 2009. These claims lack merit. For the board's claim that the judge failed to timely pursue various alternatives for reducing costs, Judge Hague submitted evidence that the majority of juveniles appearing before the juvenile court are indigent and that an increase in court fees and costs would simply increase unpaid sums instead of increasing county revenue."
Revenue flow
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio no
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
+ See more
law enforcement agencies?
Ohio Courts have not addressed this question no
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio State v. Fisher, No. CA98-09-190, 2002 WL 745330 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Probably not. Courts rest their opinions on statutory law which provides that an indigent defendant may be required to pay attorneys fees only after an ability-to-pay determination is made.
Thus, an indigent defendant may properly be required to pay his attorney fees only after the court makes an affirmative determination on the record that the defendant has, or reasonably
+ See more
may be expected to have, the means to pay all or some part of the cost of the legal services rendered to him.
Fines and fees
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio City of Alliance v. Kelly, 548 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) Other applicable caselaw Contempt proceedings may not be used to incarcerate people for non-payment of fines. A person may only be sentenced pursuant to the procedural safeguards provided in Section 2947.14
The appellee in this action urges that we accept the trial court's characterization of these proceedings as contempt for failure to obey an order of the court pursuant to R.C.
+ See more
2705.02. However, appellee does not suggest precisely which order appellant was charged with disobeying. We find that the court should have recognized that this case invoked the *134 procedures required under R.C. 2947.14 for committing an offender to jail for failure to pay a fine. This statute and its predecessor1were designed by the legislature to provide a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling to pay.
Enforcement
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St. 3d 509, 514 (Ohio 2012) The Burden of proving inability to pay is on the party subject to a contempt order
Placing the burden of showing inability to pay on the party charged with contempt is not unreasonable. As we explained in Cook, “[t]he defendant's financial condition and ability to pay
+ See more
were peculiarly within his own knowledge. They could not be known with the same certainty to the complainant, nor could she easily produce evidence to maintain the proposition were the burden of proof placed upon her.”
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 95 (1969) Court costs and fees are civil, not criminal, obligations and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments
The duty to pay court costs is a civil obligation arising from an implied contract. Obligations arising upon implied contracts and judgments *96 thereon are debts, within the purview of
+ See more
Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt in civil actions. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N.E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860, approved and followed.) Section 2947.20, Revised Code, insofar as it lodges authority in the judge or magistrate to order a defendant committed to jail or to a workhouse for failure to pay court costs, is violative of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional [. . .] An indigent person taxed with costs in a civil action is not jailed to work off this obligation. Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, expressly prohibits imprisonment for civil debt.6 In criminal cases, court costs, assessed *103 to defray the administrative costs of the litigation, are likewise subject to the same prohibition. The purpose of assessing costs in criminal and in civil cases is the same and there is no justification for imprisonment for nonpayment of costs in criminal cases but not in civil cases [. . .] By being involved in court proceedings, any litigant, by implied contract, becomes liable for the payment of court costs if taxed as a part of the court's judgment. A judgment for costs in a criminal case is a civil, not a criminal, obligation, and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments. To hold otherwise would permit that which is constitutionally prohibited.
Enforcement
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio Strongsville v. Waiwood ,577 N.E.2d 63 (Ohio 1989) A court may not order a person to appear orissue a warrant for unpaid court costs.
An arrest warrant issued after defendant failed to attend a hearing for failure to pay court costs was defective because failure to pay court costs is a civil liability not
+ See more
an obligation, such as a fine, that subjects a debtor to arrest.
Enforcement
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio State v. Ellis, 2d Dist., 2008 Ohio 2719. If community service is in lieu of either fines or court costs, contempt may not be imposed for failure to perform Accordingly, the trial court's judgment finding Ellis in criminal contempt for nonperformance of community service work to satisfy his fines and court costs is reversed.  Enforcement
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Goldie, 894 N.E.2d 1226 (2008). Failing to follow the dictates of R.C. 2947.14 and using contempt as a sanction to collect fines can result in disciplinary violations #VALUE! Enforcement
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio In re GMS Mgt. Co., Inc. v. Unpaid Court Costs, Fees and Delinquencies, 932 N.E.2d 405 (2010). The court may not collect fines by refusing to accept filings.
Plaintiff-appellant, GMS Management Company, Inc., appeals a decision of Judge David D'Apolito of Mahoning County Court No. 4, which found that GMS owes over $3,000 for court costs and ordered
+ See more
the clerk of that court to refuse to accept any new pleadings even if court costs are advanced until all prior delinquent costs and fees have been paid in full. We agree with appellant's argument that this decision was unconstitutionally entered without notice or an opportunity to be heard and is an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded based upon constitutional violations.
Enforcement
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Ohio State v. Short, 2nd Dist. Darke No. 2011 CA 16, 2012-Ohio-2546. The court may not order the forfeiture of a driver's license as a means of collecting costs.
We agree that the municipal court lacked authority to order the forfeiture of Short's license for his failure to pay court costs. Accordingly, the court's order of forfeiture of Short's driver's
+ See more
license is vacated.
Enforcement