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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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North Dakota State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
While the North Dakota Supreme Court has not expressly delineated what the ND constitution requires for an ability to pay hearing, it applied Fuller in holding that the current recoupment
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statute is valid.
Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the
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defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
Ability to pay
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North Dakota State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? As noted above, Kottenbroch indicates that a hearing is required.
Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the
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defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
Fines and fees
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North Dakota State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1978) Other applicable case law Defendant who agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain has no right to ability to pay determination under N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08.
After serious deliberation, we conclude that the provisions of s 12.1-32-08, NDCC, apply in situations where the defendant either is found guilty or pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and
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the amounts or the issues of restitution or reparation are uncertain or are in dispute. However, we do not believe it applies where restitution or reparation was resolved by agreement with the defendant through plea-bargaining procedures even though the specific amount is not known and is to be determined later. When a defendant agrees to pay for the damage he caused and has a general idea of the amount, but not the specific amount in dollars and cents, which is to be determined later, he cannot later claim in the absence of fraud, that he was not made aware of the amount or that he did not agree to the amount. After a voluntary agreement has been reached on the issues of restitution and reparation it would be a useless gesture to proceed under s 12.1-32-08, NDCC. We do not believe that justice requires the performance of an idle act (s 31-11-05(23), NDCC), which it would be to require a restitution or reparation hearing after the defendant has agreed to make restitution or reparation, as the case may be.
Ability to pay
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North Dakota State v. Nordahl, 680 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 2004) Other applicable case law Where defendant agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain, probation can be revoked for failure to pay restitution, even if defendant was genuinely unable to pay
Nordahl's situation is sufficiently distinguishable from the Bearden case. In Bearden, the defendant did not agree to the restitution as part of a plea agreement; rather, restitution was imposed by
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the court as a part of Bearden's sentence. Id. at 662, 103 S.Ct. 2064. . . . The crux of the decision in Bearden rested on good faith. Id. Unlike Bearden, but similar to the defendant in Mitchell, Nordahl knew his financial situation before he entered into the plea agreement with the State's Attorney. Nordahl was in a position to know the nature and extent of his finances and to evaluate his ability to pay the restitution obligation. Prior to entering the plea agreement, Nordahl knew of the encumbrances on his farm and other property. In his affidavit, Nordahl stated it was his intention to sell the bus to satisfy a portion of the restitution and to sell part of his farm property to satisfy the rest of the obligation. Presumably, Nordahl was aware that the outstanding obligations to the bank would go unfulfilled if he paid the restitution obligation in full or, in the alternative, the bank would lose its collateral.
Ability to pay
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Pennsylvania Com. Ex Rel. Benedict Et Al. v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 433-34 (Pa. 1973)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The state supreme court has held that it is a violation of the U.S. Constitution and the PA state constitution's equal protection provisions to subject a defendant to jail time
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simply because he is unable to pay a fine without first making a determination of the defendant's ability to pay. There appears to be no specific minimum requirements for ability-to-pay determinations. Apparently, however, the burden is on the defendant to inform and show the court that he is indigent.
It is nonetheless apparent that a state is prohibited from committing its citizens for fines without a reasonable opportunity being afforded to allow them to meet the court's directive consistent
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with their respective financial situation. In the cases before us there was no determination of immediate ability to meet the mandates that had been imposed, nor was there a showing that a reasonable opportunity had been given to allow the appellants to comply without immediate incarceration. We believe that the Supreme Court has made it plain that a defendant may not be incarcerated merely because he cannot make full payment of a fine. Therefore, we hold that the appellants must be given the opportunity to establish that they are unable to pay the fine. Upon a showing of indigence, the appellants should be allowed to make payments in reasonable installments.
Ability to pay
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Pennsylvania Com. v. Schwartz, 418 A.2d 637, 640 (1980) When is the determination of Defendant's ability-to-pay made? It is more rational to determine ability to pay before imposition of a fine.
If the judge does not at the outset determine the defendant's ability to pay a fine, he will often be forced to imprison him at some later point, when he
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fails to pay the fine. However, before a defendant may be imprisoned for not paying a fine, he must be given an opportunity to establish that he is unable to pay the fine. Commonwealth ex rel. Parrish v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 304 A.2d 158 (1973); Commonwealth v. Shaeffer 228 Pa.Super. 734, 311 A.2d 361 (1973); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1407(a). If a defendant establishes that he is indigent, he will be allowed to make payments in reasonable installments. 451 Pa. at 434, 304 A.2d at 161. Thus, rather than waiting until the defendant is brought before the court for not paying a fine, it is far more rational to determine the defendant's ability to pay at the time the fine is imposed...Here, all the sentencing judge knew about appellant's financial background was that he had sold $980 worth of drugs to the undercover agents the previous year and was currently working with his father in the construction industry, “bringing home approximately $150 per week.” N.T. at 12, 13 (August 28, 1978, Guilty Plea hearing). This was hardly enough information to make an intelligent finding as to appellant's ability to pay the fine.
Ability to pay
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Pennsylvania
Com. v. Verilla, 526 A.2d 398, 403 (1987). See also: Com. v. Opara, 362 A.2d 305, 312 (1976); Com. v. Pride, 380 A.2d 1267, 1270 (1977); Com. v. Johnson, 187
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A.2d 761 (1963); Com. v. Terry, 368 A.2d 279, 280 (1977)
Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Legislature must act for fees for counsel to be recouped from defendant
Clearly, Damario (In re Estate of Damario, 488 Pa. 434, 412 A.2d 842(1980)) cannot be construed to permit assessment of counsel fees by a trial court simply because Appellant was
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assigned court-appointed counsel, even though he was not ruled indigent. Notwithstanding the fact that there exists no case law addressing the precise issue presently before this Court, we draw support from those cases which require a finding of statutory authority before the trial court's order of reimbursement to a public defender's office would be upheld. See Commonwealth v. Terry, 470 Pa. 234, 368 A.2d 279 (1977); Commonwealth v. Pride, 252 Pa.Super. 34, 380 A.2d 1267 (1977); Commonwealth v. Opara, 240 Pa.Super. 511, 362 A.2d 305 (1975). Absent an indication by our legislature sanctioning the assessment of counsel fees for court-appointed counsel, we decline to validate orders granting such relief to counties. Parenthetically we note that § 3 of the Act of January 19, 1968, P.L. 984, 19 P.S. § 793, at one time provided for the reimbursement by a criminal defendant or a relative of the defendant to the county “for compensation and expense incurred and paid to court-appointed counsel”. However, this statute has since been repealed, 1984, October 12, P.L. 959, No. 187, § 6.
Fines and fees
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Wyoming Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350), (WY 1993)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
With respect to imposing a surcharge on a defendant under Section 1-40-119, the court is required to find an ability to pay before ordering an assessment.
We agree with Appellant that the court was required to find that he had [**28]  an ability to pay before ordering the assessment. Murray v. State, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 110, *27-28,
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855 P.2d 350, 359 (Wyo. 1993)
Ability to pay
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Wyoming Murray v. State, 855 P.2d 350), (Wyo. 1993)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
With respect to imposing restitution under Section 7-9-103(a) and 7-9-102, the court must only make a specific finding when the defendant does not have any ability to pay.
Henceforth, the court must make a specific finding only when the defendant does not have a present or prospective ability to pay. Although the court is not required to specifically
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find that a defendant has the ability to pay, the record must still contain evidence to  support the existence of a present or future ability to pay. Murray v. State, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 110, *26-27, 855 P.2d 350, 359 (Wyo. 1993)
Ability to pay
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Wyoming Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 433, (Wyo. 1990) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? The court has the authority to require the defendant's payment of his legal fees.
Under W.S. 7-6-106(d) (June 1987 Repl.) the courts have the authority to order a defendant to repay the state for the cost of defense services. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401,
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433, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119, *100 (Wyo. 1990)
Fines and fees