authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

facie showing of gross disproportionality; and, second, if the claimant can make such a showing, the court considers whether the disproportionality reaches such a level of excessiveness that in justice the punishment is more criminal than the crime. ...One of the primary considerations for assessing gross disproportionality should necessarily be the Legislature's judgment about the appropriate punishment for the offense. ...

a result of such a condition, an indigent defendant is treated differently than a non-indigent defendant. Appellant argues that an indigent defendant can be imprisoned, by revocation of probation, for nonpayment of a debt whereas a nonindigent defendant who does not pay his attorney fees cannot be imprisoned for his failure to pay a debt. We do not agree with appellant's analysis. Appellant's right to equal protection of the law requires that the law be applied equally. That was done in this case. He was given the same choice that any other defendant in this situation, indigent or not, would have been given: probation with conditions or imprisonment. He was made fully aware of all the conditions being imposed and he accepted them. The conditions imposed need not be the same for every defendant and the fact that they are not is not a denial of equal protection. Conditions of probation may be tailored to suit the needs, practicalities and realities of each case to better serve the defendant and the public. The decision whether or not to accept the conditions was given to appellant just as it is to any defendant in a similar situation. Appellant's equal protection rights were not violated. See State v. Gerard, 57 Wis.2d 611, 205 N.W.2d 374 (1973). Closely related to his equal protection argument is appellant's contention that imposition of repayment of attorney fees as a condition of probation is unconstitutional in that any revocation of probation for failure to pay said fees would be imprisonment for debt, which is prohibited by Article VI, § 15, of the South Dakota Constitution. Again, we disagree with appellant. In Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), the United States Supreme Court ruled that repayment of attorney fees as a condition of probation, as provided by Oregon statutes, was not a violation of Mr. Fuller's constitutional rights. Oregon's statutes required that a probatee not be required to pay said fees unless he is or will be able to do so, that the probatee may petition to have the unpaid portion "forgiven"; and that no probatee may have his probation revoked due to nonpayment if he shows that his failure to repay was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order or a lack of a good faith effort to make the payments. The Court approved the statutory scheme as being within constitutional guidelines pointing out that any probatee who truly is unable to make such payments due to hardship or other disability will not lose his freedom because of his failure to do so. Although the issue of imprisonment for debt was not brought before the Court in Fuller and was only discussed in a footnote, we agree with the majority's observation that, since no probatee who is truly unable to make repayment will have his probation revoked for such failure, the condition, if enforced, is not imprisonment for debt, but is rather "a sanction imposed for `an intentional refusal to obey the order of the court[.]'"

pursuant to statute. Consistent with the principles of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), and *650 **872 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), however, while there is no prohibition against the imposition of the maximum penalty prescribed by law, indigent defendants may not be incarcerated solely because of their inability to pay court-ordered fines or costs." State v. Murrell, 201 W. Va. 648, 649–50, 499 S.E.2d 870, 871–72 (1997).

the proceedings, of the costs of representation provided under this article:(1) In every case in which services are provided to an indigent person and an adverse judgment has been rendered against such person, the court may require that person, and in juvenile cases, may require the juvenile's parents or custodian, to pay as costs the compensation of appointed counsel, the expenses of the defense and such other fees and costs as authorized by statute. (2) The court shall not order a person to pay costs unless the person is able to pay without undue hardship. In determining the amount and method of repayment of costs, the court shall take account of the financial resources of the person, the person's ability to pay and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. The fact that the court initially determines, at the time of a case's conclusion, that it is not proper to order the repayment of costs does not preclude the court from subsequently ordering repayment should the person's financial circumstances change. (3) When a person is ordered to repay costs, the court may order payment to be made forthwith or within a specified period of time or in specified installments. If a person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, an order for repayment of costs is not enforceable during the period of imprisonment unless the court expressly finds, at the time of sentencing, that the person has sufficient assets to pay the amounts ordered to be paid or finds there is a reasonable likelihood the person will acquire the necessary assets in the foreseeable future. (4) A person who has been ordered to repay costs, and who is not in contumacious default in the payment thereof, may at any time petition the sentencing court for modification of the repayment order. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that continued payment of the amount ordered will impose undue hardship on the person or the person's dependents, the court may modify the method or amount of payment. (5) When a person ordered to pay costs is also placed on probation or imposition or execution of sentence is suspended, the court may make the repayment of costs a condition of probation or suspension of sentence.