Knowing where to begin can be overwhelming: each state has dozens – if not hundreds – of relevant laws governing criminal justice debt. The cards below provide state-specific facts about the operation of criminal justice debt, and a number of suggested queries in to the Law Explorer so that you may begin to research.
Across the country, onerous fines and fees pose a fundamental challenge to a fair and effective criminal justice system.
Data of all fees and surcharges Data of all fines for misdemeanors and felonies See all financial penalties in Wisconsin
Wisconsin has 38 fees and surcharges See policy recommendations Explore the data
Wisconsin has a required charge for parole or probation Explore the law in Wisconsin
By disproportionately burdening poor people with financial sanctions, and by jailing people who lack the means to pay, many jurisdictions have created a two-tiered system of criminal justice. Unchecked, these policies drive mass incarcerationPolicy recommendations. Excessive fees and fines needlessly enmesh poor people in the criminal justice system by spawning arrests, court proceedings, periods of incarcerationPolicy recommendations, and other modes of supervision for those who lack the ability to pay. Criminal justice debt also contributes to mass incarcerationPolicy recommendations by destabilizing people living at the economic margins and by impeding reentry of formerly incarcerated people who face impossible economic burdens, leading to cycles of poverty and imprisonment. Monetary sanctions often serve purposes that have nothing to do with advancing the values typically associated with criminal justice. Although fines are designed to act as punishment or a deterrent, fees do not advance the traditional purposes of the criminal justice system. Rather, fees are often authorized by state legislatures as a means to generate revenue to fund courts or other government functions without raising taxes. In many jurisdictions, court costs and surcharges fund the agencies responsible for imposing fees and fines on individuals.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.1 (internal citations omitted)
Surcharges are financial obligations, either a flat fee or a percentage added to a fine, imposed to fund a particular government function or a general fund. Surcharges improperly use the courts as a substitute taxation system. By tacking additional financial obligations onto criminal sentences that fund the general functioning of government, but do not serve any traditional criminal justice function, surcharges will typically operate as regressive taxes. Yet surcharges are a poor form of budgetary management. Earmarked funds escape the priority-setting processes of legislative budgets. Surcharges should be eliminated and government spending should be determined through the ordinary budgetary processes. Fees are financial obligations defined as a way for jurisdictions to recoup costs of the “use” of the criminal justice system, including, but not limited to, costs associated with public defenders, GPS monitoring, and court proceedings.
To avoid creating incentives for courts and localities to fund themselves based on criminal justice debt, through fees and other financial penalties, the judicial system should be fully funded by the state. Funding courts out of general revenue reflects the important principle that courts are an equal branch of government and essential to the common welfare, not a user-pays service provider. As the Conference of State Court Administrators has explained: “The benefit derived from the efficient administration of justice is not limited to those who utilize the system for litigation, but is enjoyed by all those who would suffer is there was no such system—the entire body politic.” This means funding court operations from a state’s general budget. However, the feasibility of this model may depend on the organization of courts—particularly whether the state has a unified judicial system—and on constitutional restraints on funding models.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.12 (internal citations omitted)
Poverty traps such as incarcerationPolicy recommendations and driver’s license revocation constrain an individual’s ability to earn a living and pay court costs. Poverty penalties attach cascading costs and penalties to the collection practices.
See all poverty penalty and poverty trap policy recommendations in CJPP’s Policy Guide
Wisconsin does not require driver’s license revocation for non-payment See policy recommendations Explore the data
Individuals do not face supervision consequences for non-payment See policy recommendations Explore the data
The following enforcement mechanisms are available in Wisconsin:
Payment plan/installment planPolicy recommendations Explore the law
IncarcerationPolicy recommendations Explore the law
Increased finePolicy recommendations Explore the law
Wage/bank account garnishmentPolicy recommendations Explore the law
Driver's license suspension/impoundmentPolicy recommendations Explore the law
Other Explore the law
See all laws that govern poverty penalties and poverty traps in Wisconsin
As states and municipalities have looked for revenue sources without resorting to raising taxes, the burden of criminal justice debt has become significantly more onerous for poor Americans than for those with means. The poor pay more not simply because they are more often targeted for enforcement, or because many infractions—such as sleeping in public places or failing to maintain auto insurance or selling loose cigarettes—criminalize poverty. Poor people pay more than those with means simply because of the fact of their poverty.
A “poverty penalty” exists when a poor person is punished more severely than a wealthier person for the same infraction as a direct consequence of her poverty. It may take a variety of forms: late fees, which can vary from a fixed amount to a percentage of the debt owed; costs of collection; interest charges; fees to enter installment plans; the issuance of arrest warrants (with associated fees); fines for contempt of court; jailing for contempt of court; and the imposition or extension of probation (with associated fees) until the debt is paid in full. These penalties amount to additional punishment due to a defendant’s poverty.
A “poverty trap” is a policy that not only punishes the poor more severely, but keeps a person in poverty by inhibiting his or her ability to make a living or meet basic needs and obligations. For example, making payment of criminal justice debt a condition of probation or parole acts as a poverty trap when it results in the denial or termination of public benefits, such as food stamps, social security, and housing assistance. The suspension of a driver’s or professional license is one of the most pervasive poverty traps for poor people assessed a fine that they cannot afford to pay. The practice is widespread. Nearly 40% of license suspensions nationwide stem from unpaid fines, missed child support payments, and drug offenses—not from unsafe or intoxicated driving or failing to obtain automotive insurance. Suspension of a driver’s or professional licenses is hugely counterproductive; it punishes non-payment by taking away a person’s means for making a living. License suspension programs are also expensive for states to run and they distract law enforcementPolicy recommendations efforts from priorities related to public safety. License suspensions may also be unconstitutional if the license was suspended before the judge determined the defendant had the ability to pay the criminal justice debt.
Poverty penalties and traps are bad public policy. Poverty penalties are often simply uncollectable and lead to cycles of debt and poverty. These practices often lead to incarcerationPolicy recommendations and give rise to new exposure to the criminal justice system due to probation violations or driving with a suspended license. Poverty penalties and traps cost the state money in unnecessary enforcement costs and result in large amounts of debt going uncollected. Given the often draconian consequences of non-payment of criminal justice debt, in some cases family members or friends may pay a defendant’s debt, extending punishment from the defendant to others in a way that undermines deterrence and exacerbates a community’s poverty. Criminal justice debt can also act as a barrier to reentry for those leaving jail or prison.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.15 - 16 (internal citations omitted).
Suspending Driver’s and Professional Licenses. Lawmakers should discontinue the use of driver’s license suspensions as a penalty for failing to pay criminal justice debt, at least where a defendant is unable to pay. If such licensing is premised on keeping the public safe, suspensions should be tailored to promote public safety not to facilitate debt-collection. Similarly, states should not authorize suspension of professional licensePolicy recommendationss on the basis of non-payment of criminal justice debt.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.17 (internal citations omitted).
Linking Probation Terms to Criminal Justice Debt. Probation should never be imposed or extended solely as a way to collect debts. States should conserve resources—allowing probation officers to spend their time with probationers who need their attention and reducing the number of persons arrested and hauled into court for technical violations arising out of an inability to pay criminal justice debt For example, Virginia commissioned a task force comprised of stakeholders from across the criminal justice system to study alternatives to incarcerationPolicy recommendations; among other things, the task force recommended making it easier for defendants to leave supervised probation where the only reason the defendant remained on supervised probation was non-payment of fines and fees. Similar policies can ensure that probation does not become a poverty trap.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.17 (internal citations omitted).
Sound policy considerations counsel in favor of robust procedures for conducting ability to pay determinations not only at the enforcement stage but also when financial obligations are imposed.
See all ability to pay policy recommendations in CJPP’s Policy Guide
Wisconsin does not have any law that requires an ability to pay determination before imposition. Explore the data
Wisconsin state does have mandatory fees or surcharges. Explore the data
See all laws that govern inquiry in to an individual’s ability to pay in Wisconsin
Too often, courts impose financial obligations that are simply beyond a defendant’s capacity to ever meet. Constitutional law prohibits jailing defendants for non-payment of debts they cannot afford, which means courts must make an inquiry into a person’s ability to pay before depriving them of liberty for non-payment.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the Constitution prohibits courts from jailing people for not paying debt that they are too poor to afford. In Bearden v. Georgia, a case involving the automatic revocation of probation where a probationer did not make required payments, the Court held that “depriv[ing] a probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own he cannot pay a fine…would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Similarly, in Tate v. Short, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.” The Court emphasized that a willful failure to pay a fine was distinguishable from a defendant’s inability to do so. It is because of this distinction— between a defendant who refuses to pay criminal justice debt and a defendant who lacks the means to pay—that an ability to pay determination must take place before someone is jailed for nonpayment of criminal justice debt.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p5, p26 (internal citations omitted)
Government actors face pressure to bring revenue through the imposition and enforcement of criminal justice debt which can generate profound conflicts of interest.
See conflicts of interest policy recommendations in CJPP’s Policy Guide
The three areas of law below will guide analysis about potential conflicts of interest, and inform where reform should be directed.
Money from fees and fines goes to the following entities:
State/statewide agency Explore the law
Law enforcementPolicy recommendations Explore the law
See all revenue flow laws in Wisconsin
The criminal justice debt system will benefit from robust transparency including laws designed to ensure data collection about the functioning of court debt, analysis and disclosure of system-wide practices, and opportunities for individuals to request and receive documents reflecting policies and practices relating to criminal justice debt.
See transparency policy recommendations in CJPP’s Policy Guide
See all laws that govern transparency and accountability in Wisconsin
Ensuring meaningful transparency in the operation of criminal justice debt is crucial.
Prioritizing transparency enables reform in many ways. Access to information about the mechanics of criminal justice debt—including rich quantitative data—equips advocates to identify abusive practices, racial disparities, and inefficiencies. It provides lawmakers with the tools to evaluate the financial and social impacts of criminal justice debt when proposing or voting on legislation. And it provides citizens with the information required to hold their elected officials accountable. The transparency frameworks of many states, however, impede these goals. Empirical data on the imposition and collection of criminal justice debt is often not collected or made publicly available. Even when it is, the data is often compiled by an array of agencies and bodies—clerks of courts, probation agencies, corrections officials, and private debt collection companies—which makes the information piecemeal and inaccessible.
The statutory provisions imposing and regulating criminal justice debt often sprawl across many titles of a state’s code, including those related to crimes, criminal procedure, courts, local government, vehicles, corrections, and revenue. The result is often an incomprehensible mess of provisions, as difficult to decipher as a tax code. This opacity increases administrative costs241 and obscures the responsibility of legislators.
There is also a fundamental fairness principle underpinning the following reforms. A defendant is entitled to know, prospectively, of the financial obligations for which he or she may become liable. Once convicted, a person has a right to know what financial obligations were imposed and the legal basis for that imposition. The absence of this information, in a clear and accessible form, compromises a defendant’s ability to challenge the imposition and collection of criminal justice debt. Confusion as to what debts remain outstanding against a person can lead to non-compliance with payment plans, even when a person has the capacity to pay their debts. In the worst-case scenario, it can lead to a summons or warrant being issued against a person for failure to pay, and needless incarcerationPolicy recommendations.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p32 (internal citations omitted)
End the Use of Collection Mechanisms That Act as Poverty Traps. CJPP does not take a position on whether collection methods such as wage garnishment, bank account freezes, barriers to vehicle registration, and diversion of tax refunds are appropriate sanctions for those who are able, but unwilling, to pay criminal justice debt. For those unable to pay, however, such aggressive collection tactics can lead to broader financial crises, including job loss, inability to pay other bills, and eviction—destabilizing events that push people deeper into poverty. These mechanisms should be used minimally, and only when subject to strict ability-to-pay determinations to ensure that they are not directed at individuals who are unable to afford court-imposed financial obligations.
Judges across the country routinely incarcerate people for failure to pay criminal justice debt without regard to the financial circumstances that may make payment impossible. This practice violates well-established constitutional principles. Moreover, incarcerating individuals because of their inability to pay imposes a particular hardship on some of the most vulnerable members of society, and exacerbates racial and socioeconomic inequalities in the criminal justice system. Additionally, the practice leads to wasted resources, as efforts to secure payment from individuals who may be unemployed, homeless, or simply too poor to pay are often fruitless. Accordingly, a crucial reform is to ensure that no one is ever jailed because they cannot afford to pay a fine or fee.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the Constitution prohibits courts from jailing people for not paying debt that they are too poor to afford. In Bearden v. Georgia, a case involving the automatic revocation of probation where a probationer did not make required payments, the Court held that “depriv[ing] a probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own he cannot pay a fine…would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Similarly, in Tate v. Short, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.” The Court emphasized that a willful failure to pay a fine was distinguishable from a defendant’s inability to do so. It is because of this distinction— between a defendant who refuses to pay criminal justice debt and a defendant who lacks the means to pay—that an ability to pay determination must take place before someone is jailed for nonpayment of criminal justice debt. Many states maintain laws that, on their face, contradict the constitutional protection against being jailed based on inability to pay a financial obligation. For example, some states have statutes permitting incarceration of individuals whose failure to pay is based on inability to afford financial obligations or mandating automatic incarceration for failure to pay criminal justice debt without providing an ability-to-pay.
Authorize Alternatives to Monetary Sanctions. Courts should be authorized to consider alternatives to monetary sanctions, including creating community or specialty courts, converting criminal justice debts to community service, or imposing other non-monetary penalties. Some jurisdictions have created community courts, where judges use trauma-informed and evidence-based approaches to ensure that defendants receive services in addition to appropriate sanctions, while increasing procedural justice. Many, but not all, states currently authorize judges impose community service as an alternative to incarceration, but the process could be further incentivized and streamlined. The imposition of excessive or unreasonable community service may, of course, become a significant or insurmountable obstacle for indigent persons, especially those whose work schedules, family obligations, or disabilities make community service unrealistic. In some cases, it may not be feasible for defendants to complete community service. In these situations, judges must have discretion to waive fines and fees, give defendants credit for engaging in drug or mental health treatment, or find an alternative sanction that does not involve jail. Courts must guard against replacing one vise with another. But in many instances, a well-designed community service program would present a viable and productive alternative.
Linking Probation Terms to Criminal Justice Debt. Probation should never be imposed or extended solely as a way to collect debts. States should conserve resources—allowing probation officers to spend their time with probationers who need their attention and reducing the number of persons arrested and hauled into court for technical violations arising out of an inability to pay criminal justice debt For example, Virginia commissioned a task force comprised of stakeholders from across the criminal justice system to study alternatives to incarceration; among other things, the task force recommended making it easier for defendants to leave supervised probation where the only reason the defendant remained on supervised probation was non-payment of fines and fees. Similar policies can ensure that probation does not become a poverty trap.
Suspending Driver’s and Professional Licenses. Lawmakers should discontinue the use of driver’s license suspensions as a penalty for failing to pay criminal justice debt, at least where a defendant is unable to pay. If such licensing is premised on keeping the public safe, suspensions should be tailored to promote public safety not to facilitate debt-collection. Similarly, states should not authorize suspension of professional licensePolicy recommendationss on the basis of non-payment of criminal justice debt.
Suspending Driver’s and Professional Licenses. Lawmakers should discontinue the use of driver’s license suspensions as a penalty for failing to pay criminal justice debt, at least where a defendant is unable to pay. If such licensing is premised on keeping the public safe, suspensions should be tailored to promote public safety not to facilitate debt-collection. Similarly, states should not authorize suspension of professional licenses on the basis of non-payment of criminal justice debt.
End the Use of Collection Mechanisms That Act as Poverty Traps. CJPP does not take a position on whether collection methods such as wage garnishment, bank account freezes, barriers to vehicle registration, and diversion of tax refunds are appropriate sanctions for those who are able, but unwilling, to pay criminal justice debt. For those unable to pay, however, such aggressive collection tactics can lead to broader financial crises, including job loss, inability to pay other bills, and eviction—destabilizing events that push people deeper into poverty. These mechanisms should be used minimally, and only when subject to strict ability-to-pay determinations to ensure that they are not directed at individuals who are unable to afford court-imposed financial obligations.
Abandon Reliance on Poverty Penalties. States should abandon reliance on poverty penalties. Specifically, state legislatures should enact policies: Requiring courts to conduct an ability to pay assessment before levying penalties for non-payment.
Prohibiting the imposition of additional interest or other costs for payment plans for those with the inability to pay the full amount;
Eliminating interest fees, late fees, collection agency referral fees, and other penalties incurred during a period of incarceration;
Allowing individuals to obtain hardship deferments—such as freezing interest and penalties or permitting deferral of payments—during a period of financial hardship.126
Ensuring that ability to pay determinations consider all court ordered obligations that defendants are required to pay.
Reasonable and fair payment plans. State legislatures can incentivize people who owe criminal justice debt to satisfy their obligations over time. For example, for debtors who enroll in reasonable and affordable payment plans tied to their income, courts could incentivize consistent compliance. Incentives could range from a waiver of interest charges or waiver of the principal owed after a certain length of compliance to certificates of good conduct, which might make a person eligible for privileges that would have been withdrawn upon a conviction for certain offenses. Payment plans should have no minimum payment amount.
Abandon Reliance on Poverty Penalties. States should abandon reliance on poverty penalties. Specifically, state legislatures should enact policies: Requiring courts to conduct an ability to pay assessment before levying penalties for non-payment.
Prohibiting the imposition of additional interest or other costs for payment plans for those with the inability to pay the full amount;
Eliminating interest fees, late fees, collection agency referral fees, and other penalties incurred during a period of incarceration;
Allowing individuals to obtain hardship deferments—such as freezing interest and penalties or permitting deferral of payments—during a period of financial hardship.126
Ensuring that ability to pay determinations consider all court ordered obligations that defendants are required to pay.
Reasonable and fair payment plans. State legislatures can incentivize people who owe criminal justice debt to satisfy their obligations over time. For example, for debtors who enroll in reasonable and affordable payment plans tied to their income, courts could incentivize consistent compliance. Incentives could range from a waiver of interest charges or waiver of the principal owed after a certain length of compliance to certificates of good conduct, which might make a person eligible for privileges that would have been withdrawn upon a conviction for certain offenses. Payment plans should have no minimum payment amount.
Fully Fund Courts from State Budgets. To avoid creating incentives for courts and localities to fund themselves based on criminal justice debt, the judicial system should be fully funded by the state. Funding courts out of general revenue reflects the important principle that courts are an equal branch of government and essential to the common welfare, not a user-pays service provider. As the Conference of State Court Administrators has explained: “The benefit derived from the efficient administration of justice is not limited to those who utilize the system for litigation, but is enjoyed by all those who would suffer is there was no such system—the entire body politic.” This means funding court operations from a state’s general budget. However, the feasibility of this model may depend on the organization of courts—particularly whether the state has a unified judicial system—and on constitutional restraints on funding models.
Eliminate Fines and Fees That Are Specifically Earmarked for Law Enforcement Agencies
In many states, funds collected from criminal defendants are earmarked for law enforcement. For example, a statute in Tennessee that establishes mandatory minimum fines for certain drug offenses, ranging from $250 to $5000, provides that 50% of the amount collected “shall be paid to the general fund of the governing body of the law enforcement agency responsible for the investigation and arrest which resulted in the drug conviction.” This direct link between policing and revenue generation may lead police agencies to prioritize enforcement in ways that may do little or nothing to advance public safety but that drive up policing budgets. State law should eliminate these conflicts.
Cap the Contribution of Court Revenue to Local Operating Costs
States should cap, and over time lower, the percentage of revenue that municipalities or other localities can derive from the courts. A cap insulates courts and law enforcement bodies from local political pressures to continue increasing revenue to supplement the activities of the legislative and executive branches. The reform may need to be accompanied by legislation granting municipalities or localities sufficient taxation authority to provide a more appropriate and stable revenue base for local governments. This reform was enacted recently in Missouri. Every county, city, town, and village is required annually to calculate “the percentage of its annual general operating revenue received from fines, bond forfeitures, and court costs for minor traffic violations.” If the percentage exceeds 20% (or 12.5% in St. Louis County), then the excess amount is sent to the Missouri Director of the Department of Revenue, which distributes money to the schools of the county. Passing the revenue to a different level of government reduces the intensity of local political pressures. The law was subject to criticism for being under-inclusive. Specifically, it didn’t cap revenue raised from housing code violations or other non-traffic violations, which in some municipalities are more than half the charges imposed. In January 2016, Missouri passed a new bill limiting revenue from non-traffic ordinance violations. In Oklahoma, if a municipal law enforcement agency is determined to be conducting law enforcement practices for the purpose of generating more than 50% of the revenue needed for the operation of the municipality, the State Commissioner of Public Safety can issue a notice preventing that agency from regulating traffic and enforcing traffic-related statutes or ordinances on state highways. Revenue caps have also been imposed in Virginia and Florida.
Abandon Reliance on Poverty Penalties. States should abandon reliance on poverty penalties. Specifically, state legislatures should enact policies: Requiring courts to conduct an ability to pay assessment before levying penalties for non-payment.
Prohibiting the imposition of additional interest or other costs for payment plans for those with the inability to pay the full amount;
Eliminating interest fees, late fees, collection agency referral fees, and other penalties incurred during a period of incarceration;
Allowing individuals to obtain hardship deferments—such as freezing interest and penalties or permitting deferral of payments—during a period of financial hardship.126
Ensuring that ability to pay determinations consider all court ordered obligations that defendants are required to pay.
Reasonable and fair payment plans. State legislatures can incentivize people who owe criminal justice debt to satisfy their obligations over time. For example, for debtors who enroll in reasonable and affordable payment plans tied to their income, courts could incentivize consistent compliance. Incentives could range from a waiver of interest charges or waiver of the principal owed after a certain length of compliance to certificates of good conduct, which might make a person eligible for privileges that would have been withdrawn upon a conviction for certain offenses. Payment plans should have no minimum payment amount.
TODO
Ensuring meaningful transparency in the operation of criminal justice debt is crucial.
Prioritizing transparency enables reform in many ways. Access to information about the mechanics of criminal justice debt—including rich quantitative data—equips advocates to identify abusive practices, racial disparities, and inefficiencies. It provides lawmakers with the tools to evaluate the financial and social impacts of criminal justice debt when proposing or voting on legislation. And it provides citizens with the information required to hold their elected officials accountable. The transparency frameworks of many states, however, impede these goals. Empirical data on the imposition and collection of criminal justice debt is often not collected or made publicly available. Even when it is, the data is often compiled by an array of agencies and bodies—clerks of courts, probation agencies, corrections officials, and private debt collection companies—which makes the information piecemeal and inaccessible.
The statutory provisions imposing and regulating criminal justice debt often sprawl across many titles of a state’s code, including those related to crimes, criminal procedure, courts, local government, vehicles, corrections, and revenue. The result is often an incomprehensible mess of provisions, as difficult to decipher as a tax code. This opacity increases administrative costs241 and obscures the responsibility of legislators.
There is also a fundamental fairness principle underpinning the following reforms. A defendant is entitled to know, prospectively, of the financial obligations for which he or she may become liable. Once convicted, a person has a right to know what financial obligations were imposed and the legal basis for that imposition. The absence of this information, in a clear and accessible form, compromises a defendant’s ability to challenge the imposition and collection of criminal justice debt. Confusion as to what debts remain outstanding against a person can lead to non-compliance with payment plans, even when a person has the capacity to pay their debts. In the worst-case scenario, it can lead to a summons or warrant being issued against a person for failure to pay, and needless incarceration.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p32 (internal citations omitted)
By disproportionately burdening poor people with financial sanctions, and by jailing people who lack the means to pay, many jurisdictions have created a two-tiered system of criminal justice. Unchecked, these policies drive mass incarceration. Excessive fees and fines needlessly enmesh poor people in the criminal justice system by spawning arrests, court proceedings, periods of incarceration, and other modes of supervision for those who lack the ability to pay. Criminal justice debt also contributes to mass incarceration by destabilizing people living at the economic margins and by impeding reentry of formerly incarcerated people who face impossible economic burdens, leading to cycles of poverty and imprisonment. Monetary sanctions often serve purposes that have nothing to do with advancing the values typically associated with criminal justice. Although fines are designed to act as punishment or a deterrent, fees do not advance the traditional purposes of the criminal justice system. Rather, fees are often authorized by state legislatures as a means to generate revenue to fund courts or other government functions without raising taxes. In many jurisdictions, court costs and surcharges fund the agencies responsible for imposing fees and fines on individuals.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.1 (internal citations omitted)
Surcharges are financial obligations, either a flat fee or a percentage added to a fine, imposed to fund a particular government function or a general fund. Surcharges improperly use the courts as a substitute taxation system. By tacking additional financial obligations onto criminal sentences that fund the general functioning of government, but do not serve any traditional criminal justice function, surcharges will typically operate as regressive taxes. Yet surcharges are a poor form of budgetary management. Earmarked funds escape the priority-setting processes of legislative budgets. Surcharges should be eliminated and government spending should be determined through the ordinary budgetary processes. Fees are financial obligations defined as a way for jurisdictions to recoup costs of the “use” of the criminal justice system, including, but not limited to, costs associated with public defenders, GPS monitoring, and court proceedings.
To avoid creating incentives for courts and localities to fund themselves based on criminal justice debt, through fees and other financial penalties, the judicial system should be fully funded by the state. Funding courts out of general revenue reflects the important principle that courts are an equal branch of government and essential to the common welfare, not a user-pays service provider. As the Conference of State Court Administrators has explained: “The benefit derived from the efficient administration of justice is not limited to those who utilize the system for litigation, but is enjoyed by all those who would suffer is there was no such system—the entire body politic.” This means funding court operations from a state’s general budget. However, the feasibility of this model may depend on the organization of courts—particularly whether the state has a unified judicial system—and on constitutional restraints on funding models.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.12 (internal citations omitted)
As states and municipalities have looked for revenue sources without resorting to raising taxes, the burden of criminal justice debt has become significantly more onerous for poor Americans than for those with means. The poor pay more not simply because they are more often targeted for enforcement, or because many infractions—such as sleeping in public places or failing to maintain auto insurance or selling loose cigarettes—criminalize poverty. Poor people pay more than those with means simply because of the fact of their poverty.
A “poverty penalty” exists when a poor person is punished more severely than a wealthier person for the same infraction as a direct consequence of her poverty. It may take a variety of forms: late fees, which can vary from a fixed amount to a percentage of the debt owed; costs of collection; interest charges; fees to enter installment plans; the issuance of arrest warrants (with associated fees); fines for contempt of court; jailing for contempt of court; and the imposition or extension of probation (with associated fees) until the debt is paid in full. These penalties amount to additional punishment due to a defendant’s poverty.
A “poverty trap” is a policy that not only punishes the poor more severely, but keeps a person in poverty by inhibiting his or her ability to make a living or meet basic needs and obligations. For example, making payment of criminal justice debt a condition of probation or parole acts as a poverty trap when it results in the denial or termination of public benefits, such as food stamps, social security, and housing assistance. The suspension of a driver’s or professional license is one of the most pervasive poverty traps for poor people assessed a fine that they cannot afford to pay. The practice is widespread. Nearly 40% of license suspensions nationwide stem from unpaid fines, missed child support payments, and drug offenses—not from unsafe or intoxicated driving or failing to obtain automotive insurance. Suspension of a driver’s or professional licenses is hugely counterproductive; it punishes non-payment by taking away a person’s means for making a living. License suspension programs are also expensive for states to run and they distract law enforcement efforts from priorities related to public safety. License suspensions may also be unconstitutional if the license was suspended before the judge determined the defendant had the ability to pay the criminal justice debt.
Poverty penalties and traps are bad public policy. Poverty penalties are often simply uncollectable and lead to cycles of debt and poverty. These practices often lead to incarceration and give rise to new exposure to the criminal justice system due to probation violations or driving with a suspended license. Poverty penalties and traps cost the state money in unnecessary enforcement costs and result in large amounts of debt going uncollected. Given the often draconian consequences of non-payment of criminal justice debt, in some cases family members or friends may pay a defendant’s debt, extending punishment from the defendant to others in a way that undermines deterrence and exacerbates a community’s poverty. Criminal justice debt can also act as a barrier to reentry for those leaving jail or prison.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.15 - 16 (internal citations omitted).
Suspending Driver’s and Professional Licenses. Lawmakers should discontinue the use of driver’s license suspensions as a penalty for failing to pay criminal justice debt, at least where a defendant is unable to pay. If such licensing is premised on keeping the public safe, suspensions should be tailored to promote public safety not to facilitate debt-collection. Similarly, states should not authorize suspension of professional licenses on the basis of non-payment of criminal justice debt.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.17 (internal citations omitted).
Linking Probation Terms to Criminal Justice Debt. Probation should never be imposed or extended solely as a way to collect debts. States should conserve resources—allowing probation officers to spend their time with probationers who need their attention and reducing the number of persons arrested and hauled into court for technical violations arising out of an inability to pay criminal justice debt For example, Virginia commissioned a task force comprised of stakeholders from across the criminal justice system to study alternatives to incarceration; among other things, the task force recommended making it easier for defendants to leave supervised probation where the only reason the defendant remained on supervised probation was non-payment of fines and fees. Similar policies can ensure that probation does not become a poverty trap.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p.17 (internal citations omitted).
Too often, courts impose financial obligations that are simply beyond a defendant’s capacity to ever meet. Constitutional law prohibits jailing defendants for non-payment of debts they cannot afford, which means courts must make an inquiry into a person’s ability to pay before depriving them of liberty for non-payment.
The Supreme Court has made clear that the Constitution prohibits courts from jailing people for not paying debt that they are too poor to afford. In Bearden v. Georgia, a case involving the automatic revocation of probation where a probationer did not make required payments, the Court held that “depriv[ing] a probationer of his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own he cannot pay a fine…would be contrary to the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Similarly, in Tate v. Short, the Court held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.” The Court emphasized that a willful failure to pay a fine was distinguishable from a defendant’s inability to do so. It is because of this distinction— between a defendant who refuses to pay criminal justice debt and a defendant who lacks the means to pay—that an ability to pay determination must take place before someone is jailed for nonpayment of criminal justice debt.
See CJPP’s Confronting Criminal Justice Debt: A Guide for Policy Reform, p5, p26 (internal citations omitted)
This field is the statute name or other short description.
Allows faceting laws based on which courts they apply to.
Fees and fines often vary by the level of offense. The data is tagged into the following categories: felony, misdemeanor, traffic, and other. Violations and infractions are coded as misdemeanors.
Terminology for the different types of criminal justice debt.
Free form text field of any test or definition of ability to pay in the law. For example, the law may include factors to consider in assessing ability to pay, or presume that individuals earning 300% of the poverty line or less are unable to pay.
Explains when the ability to pay inquiry would occur and who has the burden of initiating the inquiry. CJPP selected one of the following options.
CJPP selected the following options about how the ability to pay inquiry would occur.
Free text field about what the law dictates occurs if the individual is found unable to pay. For example, fines may be waived, reduced, or converted to community service. It may be that the law is silent on the question.
Both include the following entity options. The list may grow as other actors are identified.
CJPP selected from the following options of the function of the criminal justice debt transparency law.
Selected the actor that one would learn about through the transparency requirement. The list may grow as other actors are identified.
CJPP chose from the following options that describe the purpose of the law.
CJPP selected from the following list. The list may grow as other actors are identified.
Includes rules promulgated by the state’s highest relevant court or state court agency. In some instances, a state’s legislature may promulgate court rules.
Includes relevant attorney general opinions.
Includes authority from the state’s highest court or highest criminal court.
This tab includes statutory law about entities that have a role in collections. For example, laws may authorize private actors to collect.
This tab explains the structure, jurisdiction, and funding of courts in the state.
This tab includes laws about the openness of criminal justice debt systems.
This tab includes laws that govern who collects criminal justice debt, and what the money funds.
Includes authority about mechanisms the state is able to use to collect criminal justice debt.
This tab includes state laws that govern inquiry into an individual’s ability to pay fees and fines.
This section includes state laws that authorize legal financial obligations.
Free form text field detailing hearing requirements such as whether the law provides for representation by counsel or an opportunity to offer evidence.