to comply. ... Ability to pay, of course, “is not merely a function of actual earnings but is to be derived, more broadly, from earning capacity in the current job market, given one's educational background and work experience.” ... Because appellant's motion to reduce support gave the trial court sufficient notice that he might be unable to meet his obligations under the stay of the contempt commitment, the trial court was obliged to hold a hearing and make a finding of ability to pay before revoking the stay.

technical distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in each case.44 Often a poor litigant will have more at stake in a civil case than in a criminal case.... We hold today only that the United States must pay for transcripts for indigent litigants allowed to appeal in forma pauperis to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals if the trial judge or a judge of the DCCA certifies that the appeal raises a substantial question the resolution of which requires a transcript. We do not hold that every civil case will require a transcript on appeal.59 We indicate no opinion as to whether one will be necessary in this case.

is or may be able to pay the fees; and (2) take the financial resources of the defendant into account, as well as the nature of the burden that the fee obligation would place on that person. Id. at 45, 53 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 2116. State v. Mickow, 277 Or.App. 497, 502 (2016)

entails two issues. The first is whether the bill collects or brings money into the treasury. If it does not, that is the end of the inquiry. If a bill does bring money into the treasury, the remaining question is whether the bill possesses the essential features of a bill levying a tax. As Northern Counties Trust makes clear, bills that assess a fee for a specific purpose are not “bills raising revenue” even though they collect or bring money into the treasury.

be’ able to do so, that is, if he has ceased or likely will cease to be indigent.  A defendant is not denied counsel while he is indigent, and he is required to repay appointed counsel's fee only if and when he is no longer indigent. If there is no likelihood that a defendant's indigency will end, a judgment for costs cannot be imposed. ORS 161.665(3). State v. Fuller, 12 Or.App. 152, 158–59 (1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 40 (1974)

forfeiture of a defendant's property is proportional to the defendant's crime. ORS 131.585(1) (“The court shall enter judgment to the extent that the property is proceeds of the crime of conviction or of past prohibited conduct that is similar to the crime of conviction.”). (In that respect, the statutes treat the forfeiture of the proceeds of defendants' crimes differently from the forfeiture of instrumentalities of defendants' crimes. The statutes require courts to determine whether the forfeiture of an instrumentality of a defendant's crime, such as a vehicle or building used in the commission of a crime, is proportional to the crime and identify factors to consider in making that determination. ORS 131.585(2)(a)-(g).4) State v. Goodenow, 251 Or.App. 139, 144–45 (2012)

pay. Landrigan v. McElroy, 457 A.2d 1056, 1062 (R.I.1983). At such a hearing it is the defendant's obligation to demonstrate an inability to pay the judgment by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. In addition, with regard to a defendant's inability to pay court fees, this Court has held that “[i]n every instance the burden of proving indigence in relation to the payment of the required filing fee or other element of cost is upon the party seeking such relief.” Silvestro v. Almonte, 484 A.2d 900, 903 (R.I.1984). In our opinion, the hearing justice did not err when he required LaRoche to satisfy the court that he made sufficient bona fide efforts to payrestitution. State v. LaRoche, 883 A.2d 1151, 1155 (R.I. 2011)