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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. Bolvito, 86 A.3d 131, 139 |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Less about protections for ability-to-pay determination, the case law has considered courts to broadly consider ability to pay |
When it assesses a defendant's ability to pay, the sentencing court should look beyond the defendant's current assets and anticipated income during the period of incarceration. The Legislature did not + See moreimpose time constraints on an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. If unpaid, the penalty does not evaporate at the conclusion of the defendant's custodial sentence or his or her period of parole supervision. To the extent that a defendant's educational background and employment history may affect his or her potential to achieve post-incarceration employment and a steady income, such factors may be relevant to the inquiry. For purposes of the sentencing court's determination, a defendant's ability to pay should not be measured only by current circumstances, but assessed over the long term
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 148, (NJ 2006) abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court is entitled to counsel |
In addition, without referencing our State Constitution, we held in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing + See moreimprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971); see also R. 7:3–2(b) (“If the court is satisfied that the defendant is indigent and that the defendant faces a consequence of magnitude ..., the court shall assign the municipal public defender to represent the defendant.”). In Rodriguez, we considered “the substantial loss of driving privileges” as one type of “serious consequence” that would warrant assigning counsel to an indigent defendant. 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216. We acknowledged “[t]he importance of counsel in an accusatorial system,” underscoring that in a case with “any complexities[,] the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself,” and that in a case without “complexities, his lack of legal representation may place him at a disadvantage.” ...We can find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court, termination of parental rights in family court, or tier classification in a Megan's Law proceeding would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not. Moreover, the indigent subject to incarceration for failure to pay support can hardly be distinguished from the indigent conferred with the right to counsel in an involuntary civil commitment hearing. We are persuaded that the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the assignment of counsel to indigent parents who are at risk of incarceration at child support enforcement hearings.
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 190 (1971) | Other applicable caselaw | defendants are allowed to pay fines in installments |
As we have said, there has been no bar to installment payments. The matter has rested in the court's discretion. The question now before us is whether the Federal Constitution + See morerequires an opportunity to pay a fine in installments.
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Ability to pay |
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Ohio | State v. Meyer, 124 Ohio App. 3d 373, 377 (1997) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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An ability-to-pay hearing is not required when a fine is merely imposed. Rather, it is only required when the trial court decides to incarcerate the defendant for failure to pay. + See moreDefendant is entitled to representation and an opportunity to present evidence.
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We hold, therefore, that R.C. 2947.14(A) did not require a hearing in the present case because the trial court merely imposed a fine. Because the trial court has not yet + See moresought to enforce the fine with incarceration, the duty to hold a hearing under R.C. 2947.14(A) is not triggered. We note, further, that payment of the fine in this case was technically a condition of Meyer's probation, and therefore, should he be unable to pay and his probation sought to be revoked, he is entitled to a hearing under Crim.R. 32.3. In either case, the hearing requirement is conditioned upon the trial court's decision to incarcerate him.
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Ability to pay |
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Ohio | State ex rel. Hague v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2009-Ohio-6140, ¶ 18, 123 Ohio St. 3d 489, 493 (Ohio 2009) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | No. In fact, one case found that county commissioners violated the separation-of-powers doctrine for not funding courts when the court could not collect enough revenue from cases |
"The board and commissioners claim that they have rebutted the presumed reasonableness of the requesting funding because Judge Hague failed to make sufficient operational changes to reduce the courts' budget, + See morefailed to cooperate with the budget process in a timely manner, and has sufficient money to operate the courts for the remainder of 2009. These claims lack merit. For the board's claim that the judge failed to timely pursue various alternatives for reducing costs, Judge Hague submitted evidence that the majority of juveniles appearing before the juvenile court are indigent and that an increase in court fees and costs would simply increase unpaid sums instead of increasing county revenue."
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Revenue flow |
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Ohio | no |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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Ohio Courts have not addressed this question | no | |
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Ohio | State v. Fisher, No. CA98-09-190, 2002 WL 745330 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Probably not. Courts rest their opinions on statutory law which provides that an indigent defendant may be required to pay attorneys fees only after an ability-to-pay determination is made. |
Thus, an indigent defendant may properly be required to pay his attorney fees only after the court makes an affirmative determination on the record that the defendant has, or reasonably + See moremay be expected to have, the means to pay all or some part of the cost of the legal services rendered to him.
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Fines and fees |
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Ohio | City of Alliance v. Kelly, 548 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) | Other applicable caselaw | Contempt proceedings may not be used to incarcerate people for non-payment of fines. A person may only be sentenced pursuant to the procedural safeguards provided in Section 2947.14 |
The appellee in this action urges that we accept the trial court's characterization of these proceedings as contempt for failure to obey an order of the court pursuant to R.C. + See more2705.02. However, appellee does not suggest precisely which order appellant was charged with disobeying. We find that the court should have recognized that this case invoked the *134 procedures required under R.C. 2947.14 for committing an offender to jail for failure to pay a fine. This statute and its predecessor1were designed by the legislature to provide a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling to pay.
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Enforcement |
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Ohio | Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St. 3d 509, 514 (Ohio 2012) | The Burden of proving inability to pay is on the party subject to a contempt order |
Placing the burden of showing inability to pay on the party charged with contempt is not unreasonable. As we explained in Cook, “[t]he defendant's financial condition and ability to pay + See morewere peculiarly within his own knowledge. They could not be known with the same certainty to the complainant, nor could she easily produce evidence to maintain the proposition were the burden of proof placed upon her.”
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Ability to pay | |
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Ohio | Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 95 (1969) | Court costs and fees are civil, not criminal, obligations and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments |
The duty to pay court costs is a civil obligation arising from an implied contract. Obligations arising upon implied contracts and judgments *96 thereon are debts, within the purview of + See moreSection 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt in civil actions. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N.E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860, approved and followed.) Section 2947.20, Revised Code, insofar as it lodges authority in the judge or magistrate to order a defendant committed to jail or to a workhouse for failure to pay court costs, is violative of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional [. . .] An indigent person taxed with costs in a civil action is not jailed to work off this obligation. Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, expressly prohibits imprisonment for civil debt.6 In criminal cases, court costs, assessed *103 to defray the administrative costs of the litigation, are likewise subject to the same prohibition. The purpose of assessing costs in criminal and in civil cases is the same and there is no justification for imprisonment for nonpayment of costs in criminal cases but not in civil cases [. . .] By being involved in court proceedings, any litigant, by implied contract, becomes liable for the payment of court costs if taxed as a part of the court's judgment. A judgment for costs in a criminal case is a civil, not a criminal, obligation, and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments. To hold otherwise would permit that which is constitutionally prohibited.
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Enforcement | |
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Ohio | Strongsville v. Waiwood ,577 N.E.2d 63 (Ohio 1989) | A court may not order a person to appear orissue a warrant for unpaid court costs. |
An arrest warrant issued after defendant failed to attend a hearing for failure to pay court costs was defective because failure to pay court costs is a civil liability not + See morean obligation, such as a fine, that subjects a debtor to arrest.
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Enforcement | |
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Ohio | State v. Ellis, 2d Dist., 2008 Ohio 2719. | If community service is in lieu of either fines or court costs, contempt may not be imposed for failure to perform | Accordingly, the trial court's judgment finding Ellis in criminal contempt for nonperformance of community service work to satisfy his fines and court costs is reversed. | Enforcement | |
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Ohio | Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Goldie, 894 N.E.2d 1226 (2008). | Failing to follow the dictates of R.C. 2947.14 and using contempt as a sanction to collect fines can result in disciplinary violations | #VALUE! | Enforcement | |
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Ohio | In re GMS Mgt. Co., Inc. v. Unpaid Court Costs, Fees and Delinquencies, 932 N.E.2d 405 (2010). | The court may not collect fines by refusing to accept filings. |
Plaintiff-appellant, GMS Management Company, Inc., appeals a decision of Judge David D'Apolito of Mahoning County Court No. 4, which found that GMS owes over $3,000 for court costs and ordered + See morethe clerk of that court to refuse to accept any new pleadings even if court costs are advanced until all prior delinquent costs and fees have been paid in full. We agree with appellant's argument that this decision was unconstitutionally entered without notice or an opportunity to be heard and is an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded based upon constitutional violations.
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Enforcement | |
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Ohio | State v. Short, 2nd Dist. Darke No. 2011 CA 16, 2012-Ohio-2546. | The court may not order the forfeiture of a driver's license as a means of collecting costs. |
We agree that the municipal court lacked authority to order the forfeiture of Short's license for his failure to pay court costs. Accordingly, the court's order of forfeiture of Short's driver's + See morelicense is vacated.
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Enforcement | |
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Ohio | State v. Cruise, 185 Ohio App. 3d 230, 233 (2009) | The court may not use money forfeited by a defendant as a means of collecting costs. | The trial court erred as a matter of law in diverting money forfeited by the appellee to pay court costs and attorney fees. | Enforcement |