be given an opportunity to contest the enforcement on the basis of his indigency. Thus, trial courts should not entertain defendants' ability-to-pay-based challenges to the imposition of fees until enforcement of that imposition has begun. . . . The operative question for any such evaluation will be whether a defendant **643 is indigent and unable to pay at that time or whether forced payment would work a manifest hardship on the defendant at that time.

are authorized by statute. In a variety of circumstances, the Legislature has chosen to provide courts with the authority to impose costs. For instance, with regard to certain offenses, courts may require criminal defendants to pay the “costs of prosecution.” . . . we conclude that MCL 769.1k (1)(b)(ii ) does not provide courts with the independent authority to impose “any cost.” Instead, we hold that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(ii ) provides courts with the authority to impose only those costs that the Legislature has separately authorized by statute.

court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. “(3) A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the court that sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs or modify the method of payment.” We find the foregoing standards are reasonable standards for application to restitution payments. The District Court should apply the foregoing provisions to the present fact situation. In its findings the District Court should include sufficient facts to show compliance with the foregoing paragraphs.

counsel. See United States v. Bracewell (2d Cir.1978), 569 F.2d 1194, 1197–98. In conducting an inquiry and reaching a conclusion, the trial court “need not permit a full-fledged adversarial inquiry into the nature and amount of a defendant's assets; nor need he become involved in determining priorities to these assets. [However,] ... any defenses to payment asserted by a defendant ... should be fully considered.” Bracewell, supra, at 1200.

We think it arbitrary and unfair in this case to subject the appellant to the maximum sentence simply because of an apparently unsupported notion that he may not be able to **177 make good on the recoupment and restitution within ten years. Considering the lack of findings regarding appellant's financial resources and his ability to reimburse the proper authorities, we think the judgment of the trial court should be reconsidered. The record indicates that indigency may have been the criterion for imposing the sentence in this particular case, and we therefore view the sentence in this instance as a possible infringement upon fundamental fairness. Due process requires only that indigency or poverty not be used as the touchstone for imposing the maximum allowable punishment.