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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Montana State v. Morgan, 198 Mont. 391, 403 (1982)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A court may not sentence a defendant to pay resitution unless the defendant is or will be able to pay it. A court shall take into account the financial
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resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. When petitioned by the defendant, if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may modify restitution payments.
Unfortunately, the statutes do not set out standards to be applied on restitution awards similar to those on costs which are set out in section 46-18-232, MCA, as follows: “(2) The
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court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. “(3) A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the court that sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs or modify the method of payment.” We find the foregoing standards are reasonable standards for application to restitution payments. The District Court should apply the foregoing provisions to the present fact situation. In its findings the District Court should include sufficient facts to show compliance with the foregoing paragraphs.
Ability to pay
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Montana State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 492 (1984) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? A defendant cannot be required to pay fees for counsel without a meaningful inquiry into the defendant's financial status
The judgment cannot stand without a meaningful inquiry into the appellant's financial status and a subsequent finding of the record that he has sufficient resources to repay costs of legal
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counsel. See United States v. Bracewell (2d Cir.1978), 569 F.2d 1194, 1197–98. In conducting an inquiry and reaching a conclusion, the trial court “need not permit a full-fledged adversarial inquiry into the nature and amount of a defendant's assets; nor need he become involved in determining priorities to these assets. [However,] ... any defenses to payment asserted by a defendant ... should be fully considered.” Bracewell, supra, at 1200.
Ability to pay
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Montana State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 498-99 (1984) Other applicable caselaw An indigent defendant's sentence shall be evaluated under due process analysis; a prison sentence should not be imposed as a punishment for indigency
Thus, we assess the legality of an indigent defendant's sentence in light of fundamental fairness, implicitly recognizing the presumption in favor of individual liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
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We think it arbitrary and unfair in this case to subject the appellant to the maximum sentence simply because of an apparently unsupported notion that he may not be able to **177 make good on the recoupment and restitution within ten years. Considering the lack of findings regarding appellant's financial resources and his ability to reimburse the proper authorities, we think the judgment of the trial court should be reconsidered. The record indicates that indigency may have been the criterion for imposing the sentence in this particular case, and we therefore view the sentence in this instance as a possible infringement upon fundamental fairness. Due process requires only that indigency or poverty not be used as the touchstone for imposing the maximum allowable punishment.
Enforcement
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Texas Rusk v. State, 440 S.W.3d 694, 702 (Tex. App. 2013)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Court must inquire into defendant's ability to pay before revoking probation and the burden of proof is on the state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant
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willfully refused to pay financial obligation.
"The Texas ability-to-pay statute imposes an evidentiary burden on the State while Bearden imposes a mandatory judicial directive to inquire into a defendant's ability to pay." Ability to pay
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Texas Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 517–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), reh'g denied (Sept. 16, 2015),, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1188, 194 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2016) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Court imposition of costs is not unconstitutional under federal or state constitutional law as long as the money collected will go toward a "criminal justice purpose"
"[T]he statute under which court costs are assessed (or an interconnected statute) provides for an allocation of such court costs to be expended for legitimate criminal justice purposes, then the
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statute allows for a constitutional application that will not render the courts tax gatherers in violation of the separation of powers clause. A criminal justice purpose is one that relates to the administration of our criminal justice system. Whether a criminal justice purpose is “legitimate” is a question to be answered on a statute-by-statute/case-by-case basis."
Fines and fees
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Texas Acosta v. State, 233 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
There is no case law addressing this question; however, Texas courts have stated that a conflict of interest exists if counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his
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client's interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests. By analogy, then, a conflict of interest may also exist when law enforcement and/or courts are required to to make a choice between advancing justice and fair adjudication or advancing other interests (perhaps their own).
"An actual conflict of interest exists if counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his client's interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel's own)
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to the detriment of his client's interest.”
Revenue flow
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Texas Gross v. State, 279 S.W.3d 791, 793–94 (Tex. App. 2007) abrogated for other reasons by Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2009) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? No, so long, as the defendant has the ability to off-set the State's expenses
"nonindigent defendant is required to pay for counsel. To require an indigent to reimburse the county, to the extent he is able, for the expense of furnished counsel tends to
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put indigents and nonindigents on the same basis and is consistent with due process. The State of Texas provides an important service in providing legal services to those indigent citizens who cannot afford to pay for their own defense. Because of this service provided to indigents, the State has a significant interest in assuring that persons with financial resources pay for their own representation and do not take a free ride at the expense of its taxpayers. Thus, it is not an inherent violation of due process for the State to take reasonable steps to collect on expenditures made on behalf of those who have the ability to off-set the State's expenses."
Fines and fees