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17 Results
State | Citation | Description/Statute Name | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Maryland | 83 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 33 (1998) | Maryland-Attorney General opinion |
Are the same procedural protections that are required in criminal proceedings required in civil collection/contempt proceedings arising from criminal justice debt when those proceedings may result in incarceration? What if + See morethe proceedings may only result in additional fines or non-incarceration penalties?
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The same procedural protections apply when a defendant may be incarcerated. Otherwise, they do not apply. |
In similar language, the Maryland Public Defender Act requires representation by that office “at all stages” of specified proceedings. When incarceration is sought in a civil contempt proceeding, a hearing + See morebefore a master is a critical stage of such a proceeding. Accordingly, both the right to counsel and the obligation of the Public Defender to provide representation for indigents apply.If incarceration is not sought as a remedy in a contempt proceeding, the constitutional right to counsel is not implicated.6 Nor is the Public Defender obligated to provide representation.
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Ability to pay |
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Maryland | 79 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 354 (1994) | Maryland-Attorney General opinion | Does allowing different municipalities to set their own indigency standards or fines/fees violate the equal protection afforded by the state’s constitution? | No. A case-by-case standard could be used for each defendant. However, uniform eligibility requirements must be used under the Administrative Procedure Act |
In theory, the Office of the Public Defender might administer these eligibility provisions on an entirely individualized basis, through an ad hoc assessment of each applicant's financial ability. [However, i]t + See moreis our opinion that the eligibility criteria established by the Public Defenders Office must be adopted under the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act in order to be legally effective.
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Fines and fees |
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Maryland | See Md. Code Ann., State Fin. & Proc. § 3-302 | Maryland-Attorney General opinion | Which fines and/or fees may be collected by a private vendor? | N/A. Maryland has a state central collection agency which collects fees. | Revenue flow | |
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Maryland | 86 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 183 (2001) | Maryland-Attorney General opinion | Who has the burden of proof in an ability to pay determination? What is the standard of proof required? | No burden or standard has been established. Instead, the Court simply inquires into the reason for inability to pay the fine. |
"Thus, the Constitution places both procedural and substantive limitations on a court's power to incarcerate a criminal defendant in lieu of payment of a fine. First, the court must inquire + See moreinto the reason why the defendant has failed to pay the fine. If the failure to pay is attributable to indigency the court must also consider alternate methods of punishment. If the court ultimately decides that an additional period of incarceration is necessary to serve the interests of deterrence and punishment, the aggregate period of incarceration cannot exceed the maximum sentence for the underlying offense."
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Ability to pay |
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Maryland | Simms v. State, 501 A.2d 1338, 1342 (1986) | Maryland-Attorney General opinion | Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees? | Case law says at the time of collection. | "A hearing to determine ability to pay is appropriate not at the time of the imposition of the sentence but at the time of its enforcement" | Ability to pay |
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Maryland | Md. Const. art. IV, § 18; See, e.g., MD R ADR Rule 17-208 | Maryland-Attorney General opinion | What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? | They have authority as granted to them by the Court of Appeals |
"Subject to the approval of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the county administrative judge of each circuit court shall develop and adopt maximum hourly rate fee schedules + See morefor court-designated individuals conducting each type of fee-for-service ADR"
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Fines and fees |
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Maryland |
Md. Const. art. IV, § 18 (granting the Court of Appeals the authority to enacts rules with the force of law); see, e.g., MD R ADR Rule 17-208 (the Court + See moreof Appeals authorizes its Chief Judge to approve fee schedules)
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Maryland-Attorney General opinion | What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines? | Maryland's highest court can impose binding state-wide rules, including fines and fees. |
"The Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other + See morecourts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power of courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice and procedure, or administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law." "Subject to the approval of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the county administrative judge of each circuit court shall develop and adopt maximum hourly rate fee schedules for court-designated individuals conducting each type of fee-for-service ADR"
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Fines and fees |
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Arizona | State v. Robinson, 142 Ariz. 296, 297–98, 689 P.2d 555, 556–57 (Ct. App. 1984); 1987 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 233 (1987) | Arizona-Attorney General opinion |
Are the same procedural protections that are required in criminal proceedings required in civil collection/contempt proceedings arising from criminal justice debt when those proceedings may result in incarceration? What if + See morethe proceedings may only result in additional fines or non-incarceration penalties?
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Arizona courts have only recognized that there must be an ability to pay proceeding where a party may be incarcerated. Such a determination should consider whether the probationer made good + See morefaith efforts to pay.
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"In view of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bearden v. Georgia, supra, we conclude that the trial court's order, revoking appellant's probation solely on the grounds that he + See morefailed to complete payments on the fine and restitution, without regard to his ability to pay, amounts to a deprivation of appellant's conditional freedom in violation of the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”
“In considering a recommendation regarding a probationer who has not fully paid restitution and fines, it would be appropriate for a probation officer to consider, as guidelines, certain statutory requirements the courts must follow. A.R.S. § 13-901(E) authorizes a court to terminate a period of probation and discharge the probationer earlier than the term originally imposed only if it is in the interests of justice and “if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it.” A.R.S. § 13-810 establishes contempt sanctions for intentional refusal to make good faith efforts to pay restitution and also provides for modification of restitution orders if a defendant has been unable to pay restitution despite good faith efforts to do so. It would, therefore, also be appropriate for a probation officer to consider the extent of a probationer's ability to pay and whether the probationer made good faith payment efforts or intentionally refused to make efforts to pay in determining whether the defendant's conduct on probation warrants early termination and discharge from probation. The central purpose for all of these statutes is the protection of victims and a probation officer should always exercise his discretion with that purpose clearly in mind.”
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Ability to pay |
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Arizona | 1989 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 134 (1989) | Arizona-Attorney General opinion | Does allowing different municipalities to set their own indigency standards or fines/fees violate the equal protection afforded by the state’s constitution? |
The Arizona Constitution allows the Arizona Supreme Court to allow local courts to make indigency standards, but it is unlikely that local municipal bodies can set such standards without legislative + See moredelegation.
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"The Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking power is derived from Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5 which gives the supreme court the “[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters + See morein any court.” See also Barsema v. Susong, 156 Ariz. 309, 314, 751 P.2d 969, 974 (1988). The supreme court is authorized to delegate indigency determinations to the presiding judge of the superior court in each county by Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 which provides that the presiding judge of each county “shall exercise administrative supervision over the superior court and judges thereof in their counties, and shall have other duties as may be provided by law or by rules of the Supreme Court.”“The Arizona Supreme Court has authorized the presiding judge of each county to establish a procedure for the appointment of counsel by the Superior Court for each indigent person entitled to the appointment of counsel. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 (emphasis added). We have not found any constitutional or statutory authority under which the presiding judge may delegate to a county the duty of making indigency determinations and assessments respecting the appointment of counsel in Superior Court criminal proceedings. Moreover, a county has only such powers as have been expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislature. Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. 546, 548, 606 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1979); Maricopa County v. Black, 19 Ariz.App. 239, 241, 506 P.2d 279, 281 (1973). The powers of a county are exercised by and through its board of supervisors. A.R.S. § 11–201; see also Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. at 548, 606 P.2d at 38; Ricca v. Bojorquez, 13 Ariz.App. 10, 13, 473 P.2d 812, 815 (1970). The powers and duties of the counties' boards of supervisors are set forth in A.R.S. § 11–251 and do not include indigency screening or determinations for the superior courts. Thus, Pima County has not been conferred such power by the Legislature.”
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Ability to pay |
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Arizona | See, e.g., State v. Townsend, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0420, 2012 WL 3306960, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2012) (choosing not to answer who has the burden of proof) | Arizona-Attorney General opinion | Who has the burden of proof in an ability to pay determination? What is the standard of proof required? | Arizona Courts have not yet answered this question. |
"The State contends that Townsend bore the burden of proving that she was unable to pay restitution. Even assuming that the State is correct, we conclude Townsend met that burden + See moreof proof here."
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Ability to pay |
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Arizona | State v. Lopez, 175 Ariz. 79, 81, 853 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Ct. App. 1993) | Arizona-Attorney General opinion | Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees? | Case law has established that ability to pay need not be considered when imposing fines or fees. |
"Therefore, although we will consider ability to pay as one factor toward a claim that a fine is disproportionate, the trial court does not have to explicitly consider the defendant's + See moreability to pay when imposing a fine or its payment schedule"
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Ability to pay |
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Arizona | Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. No. I95-18 (Dec. 18, 1995) | Arizona-Attorney General opinion | What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? | Municipal Courts only have authority to collect the fines and fees which state statutes provide for. |
"Only city councils of charter cities which are established under Ariz. Const. art. XIII, § 24 may establish fees and surcharges to be collected by city courts, if their charters + See moreor ordinances authorize them to do so.5 City courts are also subject to the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 3; Winter v. Coor, 144 Ariz. 56, 59, 695 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1985).Ordinary municipal corporations such as cities and towns may not, however, establish court fees and surcharges to be collected by municipal courts within their jurisdiction. Unlike charter cities, their authority derives solely from state statutes. Maricopa County v. Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist., 171 Ariz. 325, 830 P.2d 846 (App. 1991). In establishing various municipal court fees under A.R.S. § 22-404(B), the Legislature prohibited any others “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” We have reviewed the statutes in Title 9 relating to the authority of non-charter cities and towns and found no statutes authorizing a city or town to set court fees and surcharges."
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Fines and fees |
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Arizona | 1989 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 134 (1989) | Arizona-Attorney General opinion | What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines? | The Arizona Constitution grants the Supreme Court the right to impose binding state-wide rules for procedural matters related to fines and fees. |
"The Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking power is derived from Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5 which gives the supreme court the “[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters + See morein any court.” "
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Enforcement |
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North Carolina | N.C.A.G. Mar. 21, 1996 | RE: Advisory Opinion; Exceptions to Statutory Exemptions for Execution of Judgment on Criminal Restitution Orders | Other applicable opinions | North Carolina is not barred from structuring a program to collect costs; however, the state's initiatives, must be narrowly drawn so as to avoid chilling the indigent's right to counsel |
North Carolina [is not] barred from structuring a program to collect the amount it is owed from a financially-able defendant through reasonable and fairly administered procedures. The state's initiatives in + See morethis area naturally must be narrowly drawn to avoid either chilling the indigent's exercise of the right to counsel, or creating discriminating terms of repayment based solely on the defendant's poverty. Beyond these threshold requirements, however, the State has wide latitude to shape its attorneys fees recoupment or restitution program along the lines it deems most appropriate for achieving lawful state objectives. Id. at 123-124. (emphasis added.)
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North Carolina | N.C.A.G. June 10, 1980 | Criminal Law and Procedure; Sentences; Probation; Restitution; Bankruptcy Proceedings | Person who received illegal gains as a part of criminal activity may not discharge legal financial obligations in bankruptcy |
It would thus be against our statute and public policy to permit a defendant who has received illegal gains and who was ordered to make restitution as a condition of + See morehis sentence to vacate such conditions by a discharge in bankruptcy." People v. Mosesson, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 483, 484-85, (1974). See also: People on Inf. of Anerbach v. Topping Bros., 359 N.Y.S. 2d 985 (1974).
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Montana | 49 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 18, 2002 WL 1009805 | Montana-Attorney General opinion | What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? |
The Montana Constitution and Montana law authorize amunicipal court judge to release a defendant on a time-pay
bail bond, defined as a bond in an amount set by the judge
to be + See morepaid in installments.
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If the court finds some form of bail necessary, however, Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-301, provides more specific factors for a court to consider. These factors include, among other matters + See morenot related to the safety of the victim and the community, that the amount shall be not oppressive, and that the amount shall be
considerate of the financial ability of the accused. Id., §§ 46-9-301(4) and (6). The time-pay bail bonds system comports with these requirements.The Montana Constitution and Montana law authorize a municipal court judge to release a defendant on a time-pay bail bond, defined as a bond in an amount set by the judge to be paid in installments.
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Ability to pay |
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Montana | 41 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59 | Montana-Attorney General opinion | Other applicable opinions | Cash bail for minor offenses may be increased to include applicable surcharges |
In order to collect the additional $10 charge required by section 46-18-236, MCA, a court may exercise its power under section 46-9-302, MCA, and increase the bail schedule for minor + See moreoffenses in a like amount.
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Enforcement |