§ 8, the constitutional provisionsprohibiting the placing of a person in jeopardy more than once for the same offense."

be subject to challenge as a violation of the Equal Protection guarantees set forth in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and in article 2, §§ 2 and 3 of the Arkansas Constitution.

not related to the safety of the victim and the community, that the amount shall be “not oppressive,” and that the amount shall be “considerate of the financial ability of the accused.” Id., §§ 46-9-301(4) and (6). The time-pay bail bonds system comports with these requirements.The Montana Constitution and Montana law authorize a municipal court judge to release a defendant on a time-pay bail bond, defined as a bond in an amount set by the judge to be paid in installments.

offenses in a like amount.

violate Nevada's separation of powers provision. Although all collection efforts can be deferred by the courts, the legislative intent underlying NRS 244.207(1)(f) is to not impede collection efforts pending court rulings at any level. There is nothing in this statutory provision which impedes the courts in the exercise of their inherent judicial power to enforce their judgments and orders. Therefore, NRS 244.207 is constitutional.

to collect the fine on a criminal judgment where the district attorney has been the prosecutor. On the other hand, there is no clear authority in the office of the attorney general to undertake any action to collect the fines which have been imposed in criminal cases prosecuted by a district attorney. The attorney general would have authority to take action to enforce fines in cases prosecuted by the attorney general. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 228.125. Similarly, the Department of Prisons has no specific authority to collect fines through deductions from wages or other property of offenders, or to institute any action against an offender to obtain the payment of a fine. The department is given specific authority to collect only certain debts owed by inmates, such as restitution or family support. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 209.346 and 209.4811-209.4843; 209.352. Criminal fines are not included as a debt which may be collected by the Department of Prisons. This specific grant of authority to collect only certain debts implies a lack of authority to collect others. See Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237 (1967). .

for the imposition of costs upon the convicted offender is that only nonindigent persons can be the subject of recoupment measures. These statutes do not have a chilling effect on the exercise of other constitutional rights under the fifth and sixth amendments.

to collect the fine on a criminal judgment where the district attorney has been the prosecutor. On the other hand, there is no clear authority in the office of the attorney general to undertake any action to collect the fines which have been imposed in criminal cases prosecuted by a district attorney. The attorney general would have authority to take action to enforce fines in cases prosecuted by the attorney general. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 228.125. Similarly, the Department of Prisons has no specific authority to collect fines through deductions from wages or other property of offenders, or to institute any action against an offender to obtain the payment of a fine. The department is given specific authority to collect only certain debts owed by inmates, such as restitution or family support. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 209.346 and 209.4811-209.4843; 209.352. Criminal fines are not included as a debt which may be collected by the Department of Prisons. This specific grant of authority to collect only certain debts implies a lack of authority to collect others. See Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237 (1967). .

semaphores, traffic-control lights or other signaling devices on any portion of the highways within their proper jurisdiction where traffic is heavy or continuous. In such cases, the municipal law-making bodies are to be the judges as to where such traffic policemen, semaphores or other signaling devices or traffic control lights shall be maintained. In addition, such municipalities may regulate or prohibit parking or prohibit other than one-way traffic upon certain highways within their respective jurisdiction, and they may regulate the use of highways by processions or assemblages. In such ordinances, the penalties provided may be a fine of not more than fifty ($50) dollars, to be collected by summary conviction in the manner provided by section 1216 of the act. Such fines belong to the municipality for the construction, repair and maintenance of the highways thereof.

payment into the State Treasury. Such fines and penalties are clearly payable to the County of Philadelphia. However, we desire to point out, parenthetically, that magistrates may collect fines and penalties only if and when the legislature has expressly given them jurisdiction to do so. Otherwise, they can merely hold the defendants for trial in the Quarter Sessions or other criminal courts of record. 2. On the other hand, fines and penalties collected by the courts of record in Philadelphia are payable into the State Treasury through your department, if there is legislation distinctly providing that the fines shall be paid into the State Treasury. 3. Outside of Philadelphia, your department has authority to collect for payment into the State Treasury any fines or penalties, whether imposed by courts of record or courts not of record, in all cases in which the legislature has provided that such fines and penalties shall be paid into the State Treasury. However, in the absence of specific direction to this effect, the fines and penalties are payable into the respective county treasuries, if they were collected by the criminal as distinguished from the civil courts. 4. In all cases in which fines and penalties are collected by administrative agencies of the state government without any specific direction by the legislature as to the disposition to be made of the moneys collected, it is the duty of your department to collect the amounts of the fines and penalties and pay them into the State Treasury. 5. Whenever penalties are imposed by law and the collection thereof is committed to either the Department of Justice or any other administrative agency of the state government and such penalties are collected by civil suit, the amounts recovered are payable into the State Treasury, whether or not the act imposing the penalties specifically so provides. There is neither constitutional nor statutory provision to the contrary, and the rule which prevails in the absence of specific direction to the contrary is that moneys collected by a state department, with or without the aid of the civil courts, is payable into the State Treasury.

pay the fee. Some statutes providing for the repayment of costs incurred on behalf of a criminal defendant, also known as recoupment statutes, have been challenged as unconstitutional. The courts generally have upheld these statutes, provided that they contain certain safeguards. As set forth in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 40 L.Ed.2d 642, 94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974), and summarized in State v. Earls, 51 Wn.App. 192, 195–96, 752 P.2d 402 (1988), the safeguards are:(1) The requirement of repayment must not be mandatory;(2) Repayment may be imposed only upon convicted defendants;(3) Repayment may only be ordered if the defendant is or will be able to pay;(4) The financial resources of the defendant must be taken into consideration;(5) A repayment obligation may not be imposed if it appears there is no likelihood the defendant's indigency will end;(6) The convicted person must be permitted to petition the court for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid portion thereof;(7) The convicted person cannot be held in contempt for failure to repay if the default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the court order or a failure to make a good faith effort to make repayment.

may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” The State Supreme Court has described this provision as follows: This is a direct delegation of the police power as ample within its limits as that possessed by the legislature itself. It requires no legislative sanction for its exercise so long as the subject-matter is local, and the regulation reasonable and consistent with the general laws. Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 109, 356 P.2d 292 (1960); see also Brown v. Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).Under this provision, counties may enact ordinances regarding “all those measures which bear a reasonable and substantial relation to promotion of the general welfare of the people.” State v. Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 162, 165, 615 P.2d 461 (1980). County ordinances prescribing local offenses and punishments for them would constitute police power measures of the county under article 11, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Such county ordinances may not, however, “conflict” with state laws. The courts have interpreted this to mean that counties may not legislate in a particular area when the state has preempted the field, or when the county legislation and state legislation on the same subject cannot be harmonized. Brown, 116 Wn.2d at 559.