violate Nevada's separation of powers provision. Although all collection efforts can be deferred by the courts, the legislative intent underlying NRS 244.207(1)(f) is to not impede collection efforts pending court rulings at any level. There is nothing in this statutory provision which impedes the courts in the exercise of their inherent judicial power to enforce their judgments and orders. Therefore, NRS 244.207 is constitutional.

to collect the fine on a criminal judgment where the district attorney has been the prosecutor. On the other hand, there is no clear authority in the office of the attorney general to undertake any action to collect the fines which have been imposed in criminal cases prosecuted by a district attorney. The attorney general would have authority to take action to enforce fines in cases prosecuted by the attorney general. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 228.125. Similarly, the Department of Prisons has no specific authority to collect fines through deductions from wages or other property of offenders, or to institute any action against an offender to obtain the payment of a fine. The department is given specific authority to collect only certain debts owed by inmates, such as restitution or family support. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 209.346 and 209.4811-209.4843; 209.352. Criminal fines are not included as a debt which may be collected by the Department of Prisons. This specific grant of authority to collect only certain debts implies a lack of authority to collect others. See Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237 (1967). .

for the imposition of costs upon the convicted offender is that only nonindigent persons can be the subject of recoupment measures. These statutes do not have a chilling effect on the exercise of other constitutional rights under the fifth and sixth amendments.

to collect the fine on a criminal judgment where the district attorney has been the prosecutor. On the other hand, there is no clear authority in the office of the attorney general to undertake any action to collect the fines which have been imposed in criminal cases prosecuted by a district attorney. The attorney general would have authority to take action to enforce fines in cases prosecuted by the attorney general. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 228.125. Similarly, the Department of Prisons has no specific authority to collect fines through deductions from wages or other property of offenders, or to institute any action against an offender to obtain the payment of a fine. The department is given specific authority to collect only certain debts owed by inmates, such as restitution or family support. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 209.346 and 209.4811-209.4843; 209.352. Criminal fines are not included as a debt which may be collected by the Department of Prisons. This specific grant of authority to collect only certain debts implies a lack of authority to collect others. See Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237 (1967). .

A state statute must be evaluated to determine if the statute deals comprehensively with a subject matter; local ordinances might not be preempted if a state statute does not deal comprehensively with a subject matter and there is room for supplemental local regulation. However, a city or town may not enact a local ordinance where there is an existing state statute dealing comprehensively with the subject matter and local law is considered preempted by state law.

Constitution provides for the funding of the common school fund, part of which is derived “from the fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the State; and from all forfeitures which may accrue.” Art. 8, § 2. A proceeding under Indiana's forfeiture law is civil in nature, and it is only fines and forfeitures from criminal proceedings that must be paid into the common school fund.

alternative procedure in working with indigents.

not limited to, past due feesand fines.”

fine or other penalty imposed is suspended, in whole or in part, such suspension shall not affect the state assessment under this section. No state assessment imposed under the provisions of this section may be suspended or reduced by the court. Based on the above quoted statute, the state assessment court costs are collected by the clerk of the court regardless of whether the judge imposes them or not. There are several statutorily imposed fees or costs which are to be collected regardless of whether the judge imposes them or not, e.g. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 19-7-31 allows the boards of supervisors to impose a court cost for the support of a public county law library in their respective counties. This court cost is automatically assessed regardless of whether the judge imposes it or not. Also, upon conviction for writing a bad check, Section 97-19-67(4) directs the court to impose a fee in the amount of up to 85% of the face value of a bad check in addition to any other fine, fee, cost or penalty imposed by the judge. Section 37-26-9(4) imposes a supplemental court education and training cost in all criminal cases where a fine of $10 or more is imposed by the judge. The general rule is that if the cost is statutorily imposed, there is no need for the judge to impose the cost. However, from time to time, a court cost may be incurred in which there is no statutory imposition. In such a case it is within the judge's discretion to impose such a court cost on the defendant.

pay the fee. Some statutes providing for the repayment of costs incurred on behalf of a criminal defendant, also known as recoupment statutes, have been challenged as unconstitutional. The courts generally have upheld these statutes, provided that they contain certain safeguards. As set forth in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 40 L.Ed.2d 642, 94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974), and summarized in State v. Earls, 51 Wn.App. 192, 195–96, 752 P.2d 402 (1988), the safeguards are:(1) The requirement of repayment must not be mandatory;(2) Repayment may be imposed only upon convicted defendants;(3) Repayment may only be ordered if the defendant is or will be able to pay;(4) The financial resources of the defendant must be taken into consideration;(5) A repayment obligation may not be imposed if it appears there is no likelihood the defendant's indigency will end;(6) The convicted person must be permitted to petition the court for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid portion thereof;(7) The convicted person cannot be held in contempt for failure to repay if the default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the court order or a failure to make a good faith effort to make repayment.

may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” The State Supreme Court has described this provision as follows: This is a direct delegation of the police power as ample within its limits as that possessed by the legislature itself. It requires no legislative sanction for its exercise so long as the subject-matter is local, and the regulation reasonable and consistent with the general laws. Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 109, 356 P.2d 292 (1960); see also Brown v. Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).Under this provision, counties may enact ordinances regarding “all those measures which bear a reasonable and substantial relation to promotion of the general welfare of the people.” State v. Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 162, 165, 615 P.2d 461 (1980). County ordinances prescribing local offenses and punishments for them would constitute police power measures of the county under article 11, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Such county ordinances may not, however, “conflict” with state laws. The courts have interpreted this to mean that counties may not legislate in a particular area when the state has preempted the field, or when the county legislation and state legislation on the same subject cannot be harmonized. Brown, 116 Wn.2d at 559.