impose time constraints on an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. If unpaid, the penalty does not evaporate at the conclusion of the defendant's custodial sentence or his or her period of parole supervision. To the extent that a defendant's educational background and employment history may affect his or her potential to achieve post-incarceration employment and a steady income, such factors may be relevant to the inquiry. For purposes of the sentencing court's determination, a defendant's ability to pay should not be measured only by current circumstances, but assessed over the long term

imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971); see also R. 7:3–2(b) (“If the court is satisfied that the defendant is indigent and that the defendant faces a consequence of magnitude ..., the court shall assign the municipal public defender to represent the defendant.”). In Rodriguez, we considered “the substantial loss of driving privileges” as one type of “serious consequence” that would warrant assigning counsel to an indigent defendant. 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216. We acknowledged “[t]he importance of counsel in an accusatorial system,” underscoring that in a case with “any complexities[,] the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself,” and that in a case without “complexities, his lack of legal representation may place him at a disadvantage.” ...We can find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court, termination of parental rights in family court, or tier classification in a Megan's Law proceeding would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not. Moreover, the indigent subject to incarceration for failure to pay support can hardly be distinguished from the indigent conferred with the right to counsel in an involuntary civil commitment hearing. We are persuaded that the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the assignment of counsel to indigent parents who are at risk of incarceration at child support enforcement hearings.

requires an opportunity to pay a fine in installments. 

into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain to her ability to make restitution or reparation. This record clearly shows that these matters were considered by Judge Allsbrook in his judgment ordering restitution. He knew defendant's age, her relationship to the victim, that she resided with her mother, that she was indigent for legal purposes, and that the victim's family had insurance of an uncertain amount in scope at the time of the sentencing hearing. The court's action in remitting the original fine and delegating the determination and scheduling of payments in restitution to the probation officer evidenced the trial judge's full recognition of the matters to be considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(d).

reasonably necessary for “the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. at 129, 357 S.E.2d at 696. Article V prohibits the judiciary from taking public monies without statutory authorization. But our statutes obligate counties and cities to provide physical facilities for the judicial system operating within their boundaries. N.C.G.S. § 7A–300(a)(11) (1989); N.C.G.S. § 7A–302 (1989). These facilities must be adequate to serve the functioning of the judiciary within the borders of those political subdivisions. Such adequacy necessarily includes safeguarding the constitutional rights of parties and ascertaining that parties' statutory rights—such as handicap access—are similarly protected. Although the statutes do not expressly pass the duty of providing adequate judicial facilities to the court in case of default of local authorities, the court has the inherent authority to direct local authorities to perform that duty.

proscribes turning the prosecution completely over to private counsel for interested parties, but it certainly did not proscribe all participation by such counsel. . . . The limits of such allowable assistance were also suggested: assistance may not extend to the point that “counsel for the private party [is] ... in control of the prosecution.” Id.8 We therefore read Young at least implicitly to approve (or certainly not to forbid) the practice of allowing private counsel for interested parties to participate formally with government counsel in the prosecution of contempt citations so long as that participation (1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution. As indicated, we find authority for this rule of limited participation at least implicit in Young and we think it wholly conformable to Young 's underlying principles. Accordingly, we adopt it as the appropriate rule governing the participation of private counsel for interested parties in contempt prosecutions.

840 (1974). Costs are imposed only at sentencing, so any convicted indigent defendant is given notice of the *102 appointment fee at the sentencing hearing and is also given an opportunity to be heard and object to the imposition of this cost. Therefore, the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied. Accordingly, the imposition of the appointment fee on convicted indigent defendants passes federal constitutional muster.

operating costs. It would be reasonable, for example, to require a defendant to pay the state for expenses incurred to provide him with court appointed counsel should he ever become financially able to pay. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). It would not however be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the state's overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him. People v. Baker, 37 Cal.App.3d 117, 112 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1974); State v. Mulvaney, 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972); Cf. People v. Teasdale, 335 Mich. 1, 55 N.W.2d 149 (1952).

statute allows for a constitutional application that will not render the courts tax gatherers in violation of the separation of powers clause. A criminal justice purpose is one that relates to the administration of our criminal justice system. Whether a criminal justice purpose is “legitimate” is a question to be answered on a statute-by-statute/case-by-case basis."

to the detriment of his client's interest.”

put indigents and nonindigents on the same basis and is consistent with due process. The State of Texas provides an important service in providing legal services to those indigent citizens who cannot afford to pay for their own defense. Because of this service provided to indigents, the State has a significant interest in assuring that persons with financial resources pay for their own representation and do not take a free ride at the expense of its taxpayers. Thus, it is not an inherent violation of due process for the State to take reasonable steps to collect on expenditures made on behalf of those who have the ability to off-set the State's expenses."