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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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New York | People v. Knapp, 132 A.D.3d 1290, 1290, 17 N.Y.S.3d 231, 231 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); People v. Travis, 64 A.D.3d 808, 809, 882 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (2009) | Other applicable case law | Consideration of ability to pay is not required when restitution order is nonprobationary | "Consideration of defendant's ability to pay was not required because restitution was ordered as part of a nonprobationary sentence that included a period of incarceration as a significant component | Ability to pay |
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New York | People v. Aloma, 92 A.D.2d 572, 57273, 459 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1983) | Defendant must raise issue of ability to pay to preserve claim on appeal |
"At sentencing, defense counsel merely noted that it was appropriate for the court 'to consider the defendant's ability to pay a fine' and stated in conclusory terms his belief that + See moredefendant did not have a 'substantial amount of money'. At no point, either before or after the imposition of sentence, was a request made by defendant or his counsel that a hearing be held on his ability to pay a fine"
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Ability to pay | |
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New York | People v. Ryan, 83 A.D.3d 1128, 1130, 920 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (2011) | Failure to inform defendant of applicable surcharges prior to defendant's guilty plea, does not deprive defendant of opportunity to voluntarily weight available option and accept a plea. |
Defendant's plea was not rendered involuntary by County Court's failure to mention, prior to the plea, the mandatory surcharge, crime victim's assistance fee and Vehicle and Traffic Law fee associated + See morewith his conviction. The Court of Appeals has held that such administrative fees are not components of a defendant's sentence (People v. Hoti, 12 N.Y.3d 742, 743, 878 N.Y.S.2d 645, 906 N.E.2d 373 [2009] ). Accordingly, the court's failure to pronounce these charges prior to the plea does not deprive a person of the opportunity to voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently weigh the available options and accept a plea
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Fines and fees | |
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New York | Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 13940, 802 N.E.2d 616, 62122 (2003) | Grossly disproportionate fines are unconstitutional. Disproportionality is determined by looking to the seriousness of the crime, available penalties, and resources of the defendant |
The Excessive Fines Clause thus limits the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense Forfeiturespayments in kindare fines if they + See moreconstitute punishment for an offense (see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 [1998] ) . . . Inasmuch as a punitive forfeiture of an instrumentality of a crime violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense . . . In determining gross disproportionality, we consider such factors as the seriousness of the offense, the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment to which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged, and the economic circumstances of the defendant.
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Fines and fees | |
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Montana | State v. Morgan, 198 Mont. 391, 403 (1982) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A court may not sentence a defendant to pay resitution unless the defendant is or will be able to pay it. A court shall take into account the financial + See moreresources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. When petitioned by the defendant, if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may modify restitution payments.
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Unfortunately, the statutes do not set out standards to be applied on restitution awards similar to those on costs which are set out in section 46-18-232, MCA, as follows:
(2) The + See morecourt may not sentence a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose.
(3) A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the court that sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs or modify the method of payment.
We find the foregoing standards are reasonable standards for application to restitution payments. The District Court should apply the foregoing provisions to the present fact situation. In its findings the District Court should include sufficient facts to show compliance with the foregoing paragraphs.
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Ability to pay |
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Montana | State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 492 (1984) | Are there limits to the states ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | A defendant cannot be required to pay fees for counsel without a meaningful inquiry into the defendant's financial status |
The judgment cannot stand without a meaningful inquiry into the appellant's financial status and a subsequent finding of the record that he has sufficient resources to repay costs of legal + See morecounsel. See United States v. Bracewell (2d Cir.1978), 569 F.2d 1194, 119798. In conducting an inquiry and reaching a conclusion, the trial court need not permit a full-fledged adversarial inquiry into the nature and amount of a defendant's assets; nor need he become involved in determining priorities to these assets. [However,] ... any defenses to payment asserted by a defendant ... should be fully considered. Bracewell, supra, at 1200.
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Ability to pay |
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Montana | State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 498-99 (1984) | Other applicable caselaw | An indigent defendant's sentence shall be evaluated under due process analysis; a prison sentence should not be imposed as a punishment for indigency |
Thus, we assess the legality of an indigent defendant's sentence in light of fundamental fairness, implicitly recognizing the presumption in favor of individual liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. + See moreWe think it arbitrary and unfair in this case to subject the appellant to the maximum sentence simply because of an apparently unsupported notion that he may not be able to **177 make good on the recoupment and restitution within ten years. Considering the lack of findings regarding appellant's financial resources and his ability to reimburse the proper authorities, we think the judgment of the trial court should be reconsidered. The record indicates that indigency may have been the criterion for imposing the sentence in this particular case, and we therefore view the sentence in this instance as a possible infringement upon fundamental fairness. Due process requires only that indigency or poverty not be used as the touchstone for imposing the maximum allowable punishment.
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Enforcement |
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New Jersey | State v. Bolvito, 86 A.3d 131, 139 |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Less about protections for ability-to-pay determination, the case law has considered courts to broadly consider ability to pay |
When it assesses a defendant's ability to pay, the sentencing court should look beyond the defendant's current assets and anticipated income during the period of incarceration. The Legislature did not + See moreimpose time constraints on an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. If unpaid, the penalty does not evaporate at the conclusion of the defendant's custodial sentence or his or her period of parole supervision. To the extent that a defendant's educational background and employment history may affect his or her potential to achieve post-incarceration employment and a steady income, such factors may be relevant to the inquiry. For purposes of the sentencing court's determination, a defendant's ability to pay should not be measured only by current circumstances, but assessed over the long term
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 148, (NJ 2006) abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court is entitled to counsel |
In addition, without referencing our State Constitution, we held in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing + See moreimprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971); see also R. 7:3–2(b) (“If the court is satisfied that the defendant is indigent and that the defendant faces a consequence of magnitude ..., the court shall assign the municipal public defender to represent the defendant.”). In Rodriguez, we considered “the substantial loss of driving privileges” as one type of “serious consequence” that would warrant assigning counsel to an indigent defendant. 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216. We acknowledged “[t]he importance of counsel in an accusatorial system,” underscoring that in a case with “any complexities[,] the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself,” and that in a case without “complexities, his lack of legal representation may place him at a disadvantage.” ...We can find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court, termination of parental rights in family court, or tier classification in a Megan's Law proceeding would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not. Moreover, the indigent subject to incarceration for failure to pay support can hardly be distinguished from the indigent conferred with the right to counsel in an involuntary civil commitment hearing. We are persuaded that the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the assignment of counsel to indigent parents who are at risk of incarceration at child support enforcement hearings.
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 190 (1971) | Other applicable caselaw | defendants are allowed to pay fines in installments |
As we have said, there has been no bar to installment payments. The matter has rested in the court's discretion. The question now before us is whether the Federal Constitution + See morerequires an opportunity to pay a fine in installments.
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Ability to pay |