defendant did not have a 'substantial amount of money'. At no point, either before or after the imposition of sentence, was a request made by defendant or his counsel that a hearing be held on his ability to pay a fine"

with his conviction. The Court of Appeals has held that such administrative fees “are not components of a defendant's sentence” (People v. Hoti, 12 N.Y.3d 742, 743, 878 N.Y.S.2d 645, 906 N.E.2d 373 [2009] ). Accordingly, the court's failure to pronounce these charges prior to the plea does not deprive a person of the opportunity to voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently weigh the available options and accept a plea

constitute punishment for an offense (see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 [1998] ) . . . Inasmuch as a punitive forfeiture of an instrumentality of a crime “violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense” . . . In determining gross disproportionality, we consider such factors as the seriousness of the offense, the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment to which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged, and the economic circumstances of the defendant.

the plea bargain, was apprised of, and understood, the contours of the constitutional right not to be incarcerated because of indigency and the consequences of a waiver of that constitutional right. Such an affirmative showing would require evidence that the petitioner had been advised that: (1) he had a constitutional right not to be incarcerated solely because of his inability to pay a fine; (2) he would waive that right by agreeing to the committed fine; (3) the effect of a waiver would be that he would not be released on parole until the fine was paid, regardless of the reason for its nonpayment;13 (4) to pay off the committed fine, he would earn credits during his incarceration, subsequent to his parole, in accordance with a disclosed rate schedule; and (5) he would retain the right to pay the outstanding balance of the fine at any time during his incarceration and could thereby remove his ineligibility for early release. In the absence of any such showing, the commissioner's categorical claim of waiver cannot be sustained.

authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

be given an opportunity to contest the enforcement on the basis of his indigency. Thus, trial courts should not entertain defendants' ability-to-pay-based challenges to the imposition of fees until enforcement of that imposition has begun. . . . The operative question for any such evaluation will be whether a defendant **643 is indigent and unable to pay at that time or whether forced payment would work a manifest hardship on the defendant at that time.

are authorized by statute. In a variety of circumstances, the Legislature has chosen to provide courts with the authority to impose costs. For instance, with regard to certain offenses, courts may require criminal defendants to pay the “costs of prosecution.” . . . we conclude that MCL 769.1k (1)(b)(ii ) does not provide courts with the independent authority to impose “any cost.” Instead, we hold that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(ii ) provides courts with the authority to impose only those costs that the Legislature has separately authorized by statute.

Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. banc 1972). This is not to suggest that those who neglect or refuse to pay a fine may not be incarcerated for their refusal so to do within the constitutional standards described in Hendrix.

shall not stay the payment of any fine and calling for its execution, i.e., immediate imprisonment in lieu of payment, *429 is unconstitutional under the above decisions.

as such, but a penalty by contempt of court for the failure to obey—either intentionally or by want of good-faith effort to comply—the sentence of the court.