provided, if the court finds that the defendant can pay without incurring substantial hardship. Rule 6.4(f), Ala. R.Crim. P.

authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

have his wages garnished. Baldwin also stated that he gets anywhere from $2,000 and $3,000 back after taxes through earned income credit and would use that money for restitution.We cannot find that there was any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in determining whether or not Baldwin could make his restitution payments. This issue is without merit." Baldwin v. State, 891 So.2d 274, 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). “[O]ne who is unable to pay will always be in a position of facing a felony conviction and jail time, while those with adequate resources will not. The automatic nature of the fine is what makes it discriminating to the poor, in that only the poor will face jail time. We hold that an indigent's equal protection rights are violated when all potential defendants are offered one way to avoid prosecution and that one way is to pay a fine, and there is no determination as to an individual's ability to pay such a fine. Subjecting one to a jail term merely because he cannot afford to pay a fine, due to no fault of his own, is unconstitutional. Moody v. State, 716 So.2d 562, 565-66 (Miss. 1998) (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983)).

the statutes do not authorize it any more than they authorize a circuit judge to personally receive fine monies in his court, or a chancellor to personally receive public monies in his. There is a clear legislative intent to remove justice court judges from collection of fines. Only the justice court clerk has the statutory authority to collect fines, give receipts for fines, and account for all fine monies paid to the county.” Mississippi Judicial Performance Com'n v. A Justice Court Judge, 580 So.2d at 1262 “This Court therefore makes the following admonition to justice court judges insofar as individually accepting fine monies: Don't.” Id. “Just as with a circuit judge or chancellor, it should only be in some isolated and clearly necessitous circumstance that a justice court judge ever undertake the responsibility himself of receiving any fine money. If that extreme occasion arises, he must give a written receipt, keep the money segregated and apart from his own, and at the very first opportunity deliver it to the justice court clerk with an explanation of why he received it himself.” Id.

must prove his indigency. Ake, 470 U.S. at 70, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Here, the trial court's order assigning Isham a public defender clearly indicates that he was financially unable to pay for an attorney, and the case proceeded on the basis that Isham was indigent." Id.

for the public defender's office. Section 25-32-7 provides that: The public defender shall be provided with office space, secretarial assistance, and all reasonable expenses of operating the office, at least equal to or more than the county prosecuting attorney, or the district attorney if the public defender represents the entire circuit court district. The compensation and expenses of the public defender's office shall be paid by the county or counties if two (2) or more counties are acting jointly. The funds shall be paid upon allowance by the board of supervisors by order spread upon the minutes of the board. Also, § 99-15-17, in pertinent part provides “[t]he fees and expenses [of counsel for indigents] as allowed by the appropriate judge shall be paid by the county treasurer out of the general fund of the county in which the prosecution was commenced.” Quitman I, 807 So.2d at 407. Quitman v. State, 910 So.2d at 1035. Mississippi's per-capita spending rate on public defense is $4.15. It is the lowest in the country, $7.31 lower than the national average. As a result, the county funded part-time lawyers continuously lack funding to conduct the most basic investigations, to conduct legal research, or to hire experts, yet another clear violation of Gideon and Strickland. In many counties, hiring an investigator or a psychiatrist in a non-death penalty case is only possible if the lawyer pays for it out of his or her own pocket. Indigent defense lawyers must handle their own appeals, often without more compensation. While attorneys representing defendants are entitled to receive payment for overhead, the amount of overhead allowed is in the presiding county judges' discretion, and is often times capped. Counties have set very low amounts as the maximum available for compensation of indigent counsel, and the judge must approve any excess funding. Unfortunately, judges are reluctant to develop a reputation for spending tax dollars on criminal defendants, so they often deny any such requests. As a result, the most basic investigations are not completed by the lawyer. The publication identified children as young as 14 who were sent to state prison for decades “after being represented by lawyers who did no investigation on their cases” and “who spent less time talking to [[the children] than a sales clerk might spend with a customer buying a pair of shoes.” Perisha Wallace, "No Equal Justice for the Poor: Mississippi's Failed Attempt to Honor the Right to Counsel Mandates,” 9 S. J. POL’Y & JUSTICE at 88-89. (Citations omitted).

defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.

defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.

the amounts or the issues of restitution or reparation are uncertain or are in dispute. However, we do not believe it applies where restitution or reparation was resolved by agreement with the defendant through plea-bargaining procedures even though the specific amount is not known and is to be determined later. When a defendant agrees to pay for the damage he caused and has a general idea of the amount, but not the specific amount in dollars and cents, which is to be determined later, he cannot later claim in the absence of fraud, that he was not made aware of the amount or that he did not agree to the amount. After a voluntary agreement has been reached on the issues of restitution and reparation it would be a useless gesture to proceed under s 12.1-32-08, NDCC. We do not believe that justice requires the performance of an idle act (s 31-11-05(23), NDCC), which it would be to require a restitution or reparation hearing after the defendant has agreed to make restitution or reparation, as the case may be.

the court as a part of Bearden's sentence. Id. at 662, 103 S.Ct. 2064. . . . The crux of the decision in Bearden rested on good faith. Id. Unlike Bearden, but similar to the defendant in Mitchell, Nordahl knew his financial situation before he entered into the plea agreement with the State's Attorney. Nordahl was in a position to know the nature and extent of his finances and to evaluate his ability to pay the restitution obligation. Prior to entering the plea agreement, Nordahl knew of the encumbrances on his farm and other property. In his affidavit, Nordahl stated it was his intention to sell the bus to satisfy a portion of the restitution and to sell part of his farm property to satisfy the rest of the obligation. Presumably, Nordahl was aware that the outstanding obligations to the bank would go unfulfilled if he paid the restitution obligation in full or, in the alternative, the bank would lose its collateral.

to comply. ... Ability to pay, of course, “is not merely a function of actual earnings but is to be derived, more broadly, from earning capacity in the current job market, given one's educational background and work experience.” ... Because appellant's motion to reduce support gave the trial court sufficient notice that he might be unable to meet his obligations under the stay of the contempt commitment, the trial court was obliged to hold a hearing and make a finding of ability to pay before revoking the stay.

technical distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in each case.44 Often a poor litigant will have more at stake in a civil case than in a criminal case.... We hold today only that the United States must pay for transcripts for indigent litigants allowed to appeal in forma pauperis to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals if the trial judge or a judge of the DCCA certifies that the appeal raises a substantial question the resolution of which requires a transcript. We do not hold that every civil case will require a transcript on appeal.59 We indicate no opinion as to whether one will be necessary in this case.