Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
Case Law
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When does this apply
| State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Arizona |
State v. Lopez, 175 Ariz. 79, 81, 853 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Far W. Water & Sewer Inc., 224 Ariz. 173, 201, 228 P.3d 909, 937 + See more(Ct. App. 2010), as amended (May 4, 2010); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 33.3
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Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Courts are not required to consider ability to pay when imposing fines. Furthermore, the Arizona Constitution prohibits excessive fines and ability to pay is one factor which can be + See moreused to determine whether a fine is excessive. In conducting a criminal contempt proceeding, the defendant must be given notice, time to prepare, and the right to subpoena witnesses.
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"Therefore, although we will consider ability to pay as one factor toward a claim that a fine is disproportionate, the trial court does not have to explicitly consider the defendant's + See moreability to pay when imposing a fine or its payment schedule" “Both the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive fines. ‘An excessive fine is one that exceeds reasonable, usual, proper, or just punishment’ or ‘one so disproportionate to the offense that it shocks public sentiment and affronts the judgment of reasonable people.’ The ability to pay, however, is only one factor in the determination of whether a fine is excessive, and that factor is not dispositive” "Except as provided by law or by Rule 33.2, a person shall not be found in criminal contempt without a hearing held after notice of the charge. The hearing shall be set so as to allow a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense; the notice shall state the time and place of the hearing, and the essential facts constituting the contempt charged, the notice may be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the person charged, or by an order to show cause. The defendant is entitled to subpoena witnesses on his or her behalf and to release under Rule 7."
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Ability to pay |
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Arizona | State v. Phillips, 152 Ariz. 533, 535, 733 P.2d 1116, 1118 (1987) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | To some degree. Courts can only impose and collect revenue where the legislature provides for such action through statutory law. |
"Under either statute, the trial court is required to set the manner of payment of restitution. The trial court thus erred in ordering the probation department to set the manner + See moreof payment rather than setting the manner of payment itself."
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Fines and fees |
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Arizona | Hughes v. Jorgenson, 203 Ariz. 71, 74, 50 P.3d 821, 824 (2002) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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Arizona law recognizes that a conflict of interest might arise where an officer or the court has a pecuniary or proprietary interest in the actions of an agency. |
"[T]o violate the conflict of interest statute, a public official must have a non-speculative, non-remote pecuniary or proprietary interest in the decision at issue. The statutes require public officials to + See moredisclose potential conflicts and, in most instances, to then refrain from acting on issues on which the conflict exists"
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Enforcement |
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Arizona | State v. Taylor, 216 Ariz. 327, 334, 166 P.3d 118, 125 (Ct. App. 2007) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Yes. Statutory law only allows the state to recoup fees which the defendnat has a present ability to pay. |
"Even if the court's statement that a payment plan can be worked out with the court's judicial assistance unit can be considered as making the order conditional, delegating such authority + See moreis not allowed under the rule. Rule 6.7(d) requires the court itself to balance financial resources against substantial hardship at the time the fee is imposed. Thus, based on the purpose of A.R.S. § 11–584(C) and Rule 6.7(d) as explained by the Arizona Supreme Court in Espinoza, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute and rule, and the language used in the opinions quoted above, we hold that a court may only consider the defendant's present financial resources when making a determination pursuant to A.R.S. § 11–584(C) and Rule 6.7(d)."
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Ability to pay |
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Arizona | State v. Leyva, 165 Ariz. 269, 798 P.2d 407, 60 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 61, 1990 Ariz. App. LEXIS 165 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) | Other applicable caselaw | Statutory law allows trial courts to consider ability to pay when constructing a payment plan even where it cannot explicitly consider ability to pay when imposing a fee | "The trial court retains discretion under this section and § 13-810 to consider the economic circumstances of the defendant in determining the manner of payment" | Ability to pay |
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Georgia | Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699 (1942) | Does the states separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? |
No, Statute authorizing counties and municipal corporations to construct revenue producing undertakings, and in anticipation of the collection of revenue therefrom to issue certificates payable solely from such revenue, does + See morenot violate constitutional provision limiting the powers of counties and municipalities in relation to contracting debts
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neither the act nor the ordinance violates the constitutional provision above referred to. | Revenue flow |
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Georgia | Messenger v. State, 72 S.E.2d 460 (1952) | Other applicable caselaw | The inhibition of the constitution against imprisonment for debt applies to any and all such imprisonment, irrespective of the period of its duration or the means whereby it is accomplished | the Constitution of Georgia forbids imprisonment for debt | Ability to pay |
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Georgia | State v. Higgins, 326 S.E.2d 728, (Ga. 1985) | Other applicable caselaw | invalidating an income tax law that authorized punishment solely for the nonpayment of income taxes |
[A] criminal provision drawn in terms of a wilful failure to pay tax would be an entirely different matter, as it would catch the intentional tax evader without at the + See moresame time ensnaring the hapless pauper.
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Ability to pay |
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Georgia | Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374 | Other applicable caselaw |
Before revoking a defendant's probation based solely on the failure to pay fines, fees, or surchagres costs, the trial court is required to make a finding as to defendant's wilfulness, + See moreand if it concluded that defendant was not at fault, the court is required to consider other punishment alternatives.
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"Although we do not interfere with a revocation of probation unless the trial court has manifestly abused its discretion, we conclude here that such an abuse occurred. In the instant + See morecase, the trial court made no express or written findings as to the reasons for Johnson's failure to pay or as to the inadequacy of alternative punishments. Rather, it inquired only as to Johnson's fitness to work before deciding to revoke Johnson's probation. Therefore, because the trial court made this determination without making the findings required by Bearden, it committed reversible error." Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374(citing Bearden v. Georgia, 460 U.S. 660 (1983))
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Ability to pay |