ability to pay when imposing a fine or its payment schedule" “Both the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive fines. ‘An excessive fine is one that exceeds reasonable, usual, proper, or just punishment’ or ‘one so disproportionate to the offense that it shocks public sentiment and affronts the judgment of reasonable people.’ The ability to pay, however, is only one factor in the determination of whether a fine is excessive, and that factor is not dispositive” "Except as provided by law or by Rule 33.2, a person shall not be found in criminal contempt without a hearing held after notice of the charge. The hearing shall be set so as to allow a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense; the notice shall state the time and place of the hearing, and the essential facts constituting the contempt charged, the notice may be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the person charged, or by an order to show cause. The defendant is entitled to subpoena witnesses on his or her behalf and to release under Rule 7."

of payment rather than setting the manner of payment itself."

disclose potential conflicts and, in most instances, to then refrain from acting on issues on which the conflict exists"

is not allowed under the rule. Rule 6.7(d) requires the court itself to balance financial resources against substantial hardship at the time the fee is imposed. Thus, based on the purpose of A.R.S. § 11–584(C) and Rule 6.7(d) as explained by the Arizona Supreme Court in Espinoza, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute and rule, and the language used in the opinions quoted above, we hold that a court may only consider the defendant's present financial resources when making a determination pursuant to A.R.S. § 11–584(C) and Rule 6.7(d)."

authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. banc 1972). This is not to suggest that those who neglect or refuse to pay a fine may not be incarcerated for their refusal so to do within the constitutional standards described in Hendrix.

shall not stay the payment of any fine and calling for its execution, i.e., immediate imprisonment in lieu of payment, *429 is unconstitutional under the above decisions.

as such, but a penalty by contempt of court for the failure to obey—either intentionally or by want of good-faith effort to comply—the sentence of the court.

time served without giving an opportunity to pay in the manner provided bystatute, and without affording an opportunity to show indigency.

It may be true that technically costs assessed are not part of the punishment or penalty for an offense. The plaintiff cites cases from other jurisdictions which so hold. However, it does not then necessarily follow that exempting a certain type or class of offense from the imposition of costs constitutes an unconstitutional classification.

to comply. ... Ability to pay, of course, “is not merely a function of actual earnings but is to be derived, more broadly, from earning capacity in the current job market, given one's educational background and work experience.” ... Because appellant's motion to reduce support gave the trial court sufficient notice that he might be unable to meet his obligations under the stay of the contempt commitment, the trial court was obliged to hold a hearing and make a finding of ability to pay before revoking the stay.

technical distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in each case.44 Often a poor litigant will have more at stake in a civil case than in a criminal case.... We hold today only that the United States must pay for transcripts for indigent litigants allowed to appeal in forma pauperis to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals if the trial judge or a judge of the DCCA certifies that the appeal raises a substantial question the resolution of which requires a transcript. We do not hold that every civil case will require a transcript on appeal.59 We indicate no opinion as to whether one will be necessary in this case.