resources; (D) The willfulness of the defendant's failure to pay; and (E) Any other special circumstances that may have a bearing on the defendant's ability to pay."

235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), both of which stand *341 for the proposition that a sentence to imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine works an invidious discrimination against indigent defendants in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

be given an opportunity to contest the enforcement on the basis of his indigency. Thus, trial courts should not entertain defendants' ability-to-pay-based challenges to the imposition of fees until enforcement of that imposition has begun. . . . The operative question for any such evaluation will be whether a defendant **643 is indigent and unable to pay at that time or whether forced payment would work a manifest hardship on the defendant at that time.

are authorized by statute. In a variety of circumstances, the Legislature has chosen to provide courts with the authority to impose costs. For instance, with regard to certain offenses, courts may require criminal defendants to pay the “costs of prosecution.” . . . we conclude that MCL 769.1k (1)(b)(ii ) does not provide courts with the independent authority to impose “any cost.” Instead, we hold that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(ii ) provides courts with the authority to impose only those costs that the Legislature has separately authorized by statute.

illegitimate in the governmental interest in recouping costs expended for public defense whether or not the defendant is convicted. Moreover, the statutory scheme under RSA 604-A:9 is rationally related to this purpose in that it inquires into a defendant's *614 ability to pay and outlines procedures for recoupment orders, collection and appeal of such orders.

noncompliance with the court's order. Probation violation, however, is not a criminal offense, and revocation requires only a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, of misplaced trust. . . The State's initial burden when, as here, it brings a petition, is to show that the defendant did not meet a condition of his sentence, in this case, the payment of restitution. The court then “must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay.” Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672, 103 S.Ct. at 2072. If the defendant then “demonstrate[s] sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt,” id. at 671, 103 S.Ct. at 2072, alternatives to imprisonment must be considered by the court before probation may be revoked and imprisonment ordered. Id. at 672, 103 S.Ct. at 2072.

to comply. ... Ability to pay, of course, “is not merely a function of actual earnings but is to be derived, more broadly, from earning capacity in the current job market, given one's educational background and work experience.” ... Because appellant's motion to reduce support gave the trial court sufficient notice that he might be unable to meet his obligations under the stay of the contempt commitment, the trial court was obliged to hold a hearing and make a finding of ability to pay before revoking the stay.

technical distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in each case.44 Often a poor litigant will have more at stake in a civil case than in a criminal case.... We hold today only that the United States must pay for transcripts for indigent litigants allowed to appeal in forma pauperis to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals if the trial judge or a judge of the DCCA certifies that the appeal raises a substantial question the resolution of which requires a transcript. We do not hold that every civil case will require a transcript on appeal.59 We indicate no opinion as to whether one will be necessary in this case.