under the Indigent Defense Act:(1) to which he was not entitled; (2) with respect to which he was not a needy person when he received it; or (3) with respect to which he has failed to make the certificate required by Section 62 B of the Indigent Defense Act and for which he refuses to pay. Suit must be brought within six years after the date on which the aid was received. B. The district attorney may, on behalf of the state, recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person other than a person covered by Subsection A who has received legal assistance under the Indigent Defense Act and who, on the date on which suit is brought, is financially able to pay or reimburse the state for it according to the standards of ability to pay applicable under the Indigent Defense Act but refuses to do so. Suit must be brought within three years after the date on which the benefit was received. C. Amounts recovered under this section shall be paid to the state treasurer for credit to the state general fund.

the IDA create the statutory apparatus for providing legal representation to indigent criminal defendants. These statutes and other provisions indicate that the Department will determine under its guidelines whether a particular defendant is indigent and therefore entitled to the legal assistance of a public defender. Courts should give great deference to such determinations by the Department, although they retain the ultimate authority to determine indigence and the discretionary ability to order the appointment of a public defender when it is necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional or statutory rights.

the legal and factual issues, and the defenses that might be presented. We hold that the trial court must make a case-by-case determination, based on articulated reasons, whether fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel to assist an indigent defendant in a nonsupport civil contempt proceeding, and may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, appoint counsel in the proper case."

counsel. Depending on the facts, more than one inquiry may be necessary. In Elliott v. District Court In & For City & County of Denver, 402 P.2d 65 (Colo.1965), the defendant informed the court that he had an expectancy of money. When the expectancy failed to materialize, he brought it to attention of the court at a later date. When defendant makes a reasonable showing of indigency in support of his request for court-appointed counsel, the trial court has a duty under s 41—11—2, N.M.S.A. 1953, to inquire into the facts claimed by defendant. This does not require an independent inquiry by the court. It does require sufficient questioning by the court to enable the court either to decide the question of indigency at that time or to direct that defendant is to report further to the court on the question of obtaining counsel.”

simply impose the fee in a perfunctory manner. Rather, the court must give the defendant notice that it is considering imposing the fee, and the defendant must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding his or her ability to pay and any other relevant circumstances. The hearing must focus on the costs of representation, the defendant's financial circumstances, and the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay.

defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.

defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.

the amounts or the issues of restitution or reparation are uncertain or are in dispute. However, we do not believe it applies where restitution or reparation was resolved by agreement with the defendant through plea-bargaining procedures even though the specific amount is not known and is to be determined later. When a defendant agrees to pay for the damage he caused and has a general idea of the amount, but not the specific amount in dollars and cents, which is to be determined later, he cannot later claim in the absence of fraud, that he was not made aware of the amount or that he did not agree to the amount. After a voluntary agreement has been reached on the issues of restitution and reparation it would be a useless gesture to proceed under s 12.1-32-08, NDCC. We do not believe that justice requires the performance of an idle act (s 31-11-05(23), NDCC), which it would be to require a restitution or reparation hearing after the defendant has agreed to make restitution or reparation, as the case may be.

the court as a part of Bearden's sentence. Id. at 662, 103 S.Ct. 2064. . . . The crux of the decision in Bearden rested on good faith. Id. Unlike Bearden, but similar to the defendant in Mitchell, Nordahl knew his financial situation before he entered into the plea agreement with the State's Attorney. Nordahl was in a position to know the nature and extent of his finances and to evaluate his ability to pay the restitution obligation. Prior to entering the plea agreement, Nordahl knew of the encumbrances on his farm and other property. In his affidavit, Nordahl stated it was his intention to sell the bus to satisfy a portion of the restitution and to sell part of his farm property to satisfy the rest of the obligation. Presumably, Nordahl was aware that the outstanding obligations to the bank would go unfulfilled if he paid the restitution obligation in full or, in the alternative, the bank would lose its collateral.

sought to enforce the fine with incarceration, the duty to hold a hearing under R.C. 2947.14(A) is not triggered. We note, further, that payment of the fine in this case was technically a condition of Meyer's probation, and therefore, should he be unable to pay and his probation sought to be revoked, he is entitled to a hearing under Crim.R. 32.3. In either case, the hearing requirement is conditioned upon the trial court's decision to incarcerate him.

failed to cooperate with the budget process in a timely manner, and has sufficient money to operate the courts for the remainder of 2009. These claims lack merit. For the board's claim that the judge failed to timely pursue various alternatives for reducing costs, Judge Hague submitted evidence that the majority of juveniles appearing before the juvenile court are indigent and that an increase in court fees and costs would simply increase unpaid sums instead of increasing county revenue."

may be expected to have, the means to pay all or some part of the cost of the legal services rendered to him.

2705.02. However, appellee does not suggest precisely which order appellant was charged with disobeying. We find that the court should have recognized that this case invoked the *134 procedures required under R.C. 2947.14 for committing an offender to jail for failure to pay a fine. This statute and its predecessor1were designed by the legislature to provide a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling to pay.

were peculiarly within his own knowledge. They could not be known with the same certainty to the complainant, nor could she easily produce evidence to maintain the proposition were the burden of proof placed upon her.”

Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt in civil actions. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N.E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860, approved and followed.) Section 2947.20, Revised Code, insofar as it lodges authority in the judge or magistrate to order a defendant committed to jail or to a workhouse for failure to pay court costs, is violative of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional [. . .] An indigent person taxed with costs in a civil action is not jailed to work off this obligation. Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, expressly prohibits imprisonment for civil debt.6 In criminal cases, court costs, assessed *103 to defray the administrative costs of the litigation, are likewise subject to the same prohibition. The purpose of assessing costs in criminal and in civil cases is the same and there is no justification for imprisonment for nonpayment of costs in criminal cases but not in civil cases [. . .] By being involved in court proceedings, any litigant, by implied contract, becomes liable for the payment of court costs if taxed as a part of the court's judgment. A judgment for costs in a criminal case is a civil, not a criminal, obligation, and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments. To hold otherwise would permit that which is constitutionally prohibited.

an obligation, such as a fine, that subjects a debtor to arrest.