authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. “(3) A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the court that sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs or modify the method of payment.” We find the foregoing standards are reasonable standards for application to restitution payments. The District Court should apply the foregoing provisions to the present fact situation. In its findings the District Court should include sufficient facts to show compliance with the foregoing paragraphs.

counsel. See United States v. Bracewell (2d Cir.1978), 569 F.2d 1194, 1197–98. In conducting an inquiry and reaching a conclusion, the trial court “need not permit a full-fledged adversarial inquiry into the nature and amount of a defendant's assets; nor need he become involved in determining priorities to these assets. [However,] ... any defenses to payment asserted by a defendant ... should be fully considered.” Bracewell, supra, at 1200.

We think it arbitrary and unfair in this case to subject the appellant to the maximum sentence simply because of an apparently unsupported notion that he may not be able to **177 make good on the recoupment and restitution within ten years. Considering the lack of findings regarding appellant's financial resources and his ability to reimburse the proper authorities, we think the judgment of the trial court should be reconsidered. The record indicates that indigency may have been the criterion for imposing the sentence in this particular case, and we therefore view the sentence in this instance as a possible infringement upon fundamental fairness. Due process requires only that indigency or poverty not be used as the touchstone for imposing the maximum allowable punishment.

be able to pay;4. The financial resources of the defendant must be taken into account;5. A repayment obligation may not be imposed if it appears there is no likelihood the defendant's indigency will end;6. The convicted person must be permitted to petition the court for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid portion; 7. The convicted person cannot be held in contempt for failure to repay if the default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the court order or a failure to make a good faith effort to make repayment.

sense dictates that a determination of ability to pay and an inquiry into defendant's finances is not required before a recoupment order may be entered against an indigent defendant as it is nearly impossible to predict ability to pay over a period of 10 years or longer.6 However, we hold that before enforced collection or any sanction is imposed for nonpayment, there must be an inquiry into ability to pay. State v. Blank, 131 Wash.2d 230, 239-42 (1997)

imposes LFOs. This inquiry also requires the court to consider important factors, such as incarceration and a defendant's other debts, including restitution, when determining a defendant's ability to pay. Because the records in this case do not show that the sentencing judges made this inquiry into either defendant's ability to pay, we remand the cases to the trial courts for new sentence hearings.

855 P.2d 350, 359 (Wyo. 1993)

find that a defendant has the ability to pay, the record must still contain evidence to  support the existence of a present or future ability to pay. Murray v. State, 1993 Wyo. LEXIS 110, *26-27, 855 P.2d 350, 359 (Wyo. 1993)

433, 1990 Wyo. LEXIS 119, *100 (Wyo. 1990)